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The last few decades have seen efforts to develop community-based planning models and 
other mechanisms for increased community participation in the land use approval process. 
Community Benefits Agreements (CBAs), in particular, have risen in popularity across the 
nation as a tool for ensuring meaningful participation in development. Such agreements 
generally arise from direct negotiation between community groups and developers where 
community groups push to secure community benefits in exchange for support. At the same time, 
however, takings law doctrine may be shifting in a way that could dissuade cities from actively 
incorporating community groups into planning or negotiating with developers. Two Supreme 
Court decisions in the 1980s and 1990s, Nollan v. California Coastal Commission1and Dolan v. 
City of Tigard,2 imposed limits on how a municipality could exact benefits from a developer to 
guard against involuntary taking of property. In addition, states have increasingly enacted 
statutes curbing cities’ powers when it comes to exactions.3 
 To the extent that including community groups in negotiations between cities and 
developers could lead to involuntary takings claims by developers when those groups push for 
benefits, the shift in takings law may arguably encourage planning departments to avoid creating 
processes or mechanisms that actively involve community groups in this manner. Such a 
possibility invites analysis into how cities actually craft processes for community participation in 
land use decision making. This paper examines New Haven, Connecticut’s formal and informal 
mechanisms for community participation.  
                                                          
1 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n., 483 U.S. 825 (1987).  
 
2 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
 





Although academics have explored the shift towards increased community participation 
and devoted much study to the principles that underlie (or should underlie) it, few articles 
analyze the way particular cities respond to those trends and principles. And while a rich 
literature explores the consequences of Nollan and Dolan, articles have not probed the potential 
indirect impact of those decisions on a city’s approach to community participation.4 Thus, this 
article responds in a practical way to the theoretical tension between the trend pushing for more 
community participation and the trend pushing for increased scrutiny of exactions. It also aims 
more generally to contribute to the literature on community participation in land use.  
New Haven has long been one of the poorest cities in the country with approximately 
24% of its population living below poverty.5 Not surprisingly, City Planner Karyn Gilvarg notes 
that she lives “in fear of” developers “walk[ing] out” given the need to balance jobs, taxes, and 
other pressures.6 Yet, despite its seemingly dire need for development and investment, New 
Haven has also stood out nationally by supporting community groups’ push for CBAs, which, by 
nature, will almost inevitably slow down or threaten proposed developments. In 2004, the Board 
                                                          
4See e.g., David L. Callies & Julie A. Tappendorf, Unconstitutional Land Development Conditions and the 
Development Agreement Solution: Bargaining for Public Facilities After Nollan and Dolan, 51 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 663 (2001) (analyzing development agreements and arguing that such agreements are a solution to the 
constitutional limits constraining negotiations between local governments and developers); Lee Anne Fennell, Hard 
Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1, 4, 6 (2000) (arguing that the Nollan 
and Dolan decisions have increasingly led to a “conceptual disconnect” resulting from constraints on land use 
bargains without similar constraints on other land use decisions carried out by local governments and proposing a 
“framework for land use entitlements which would allow unrestricted bargaining over land use”); Vicki Been, "Exit" 
As A Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 
473, 478 (1991) (“[A]nalyz[es] whether competition in the market for development is sufficient to constrain local 
governments from overregulating or overcharging through development exactions, and therefore renders 
unnecessary the judicial scrutiny associated with the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.”). 
 
5 The U.S. Census bureau reports a population in New Haven of approximately 124,000. US CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/09/0952000.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2011). According to American 
Community Survey statistics for the 2005-2009 period, 24.4% of New Haven’s population lives below poverty. US 
CENSUS BUREAU,  http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/STTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=16000US0952000&-
qr_name=ACS_2009_5YR_G00_S1701&-ds_name=ACS_2009_5YR_G00_ (last visited Apr. 23, 2011). 
 





of Aldermen adopted a Resolution to encourage such agreements,7 and in 2006 the City entered 
into a CBA with a cancer center seeking to expand.8  
Part II of this paper discusses in more detail the trends in land use that make the study of 
community participation in practice especially relevant today. Part III briefly traces some basic 
theory on the meanings, origins, and reasons for community participation in land use. Part IV 
begins an examination of how New Haven includes the community in land use decision making 
by summarizing federal, state, and local laws that constitute the basic formal mechanisms for 
participation. Part V uses four case studies to delve into the different ways the City affirmatively 
brings communities into the land development process or otherwise allows communities to shape 
the nature of their participation. Part VI distills the case studies presented to construct a more 
generalized analysis of the interplay between formal and informal mechanisms. Part VII 
concludes with a summary of how New Haven arguably approaches community participation in 
light of two possibly conflicting trends.  
Overall, this study of community participation in New Haven’s land use approval process 
identifies a flexible planning process that allows for meaningful community participation. It also 
identifies planners who pay little, if any, attention to the trend in takings law embodied by 
decisions like Nollan and Dolan when developing their approach to community participation. 
And in making observations about flexibility in New Haven’s approach to planning, this paper 
adds to Shruti Ravikumar Jayaraman’s empirical assessment of planning in New Haven. 
Ravikumar Jayaraman argues that New Haven’s Planned Development District (PDD) process (a 
                                                          
7 New Haven, Conn., Resolution Encouraging Developers to Enter Into Community Benefits Agreements in Order 
to Enhance the Economic Viability of New Haven (July 6, 2004) (passed unanimously by the New Haven Board of 
Aldermen) (on file with author).  
  
8Louise Simmons & Stephanie Luce, Community Benefits Agreements: Lessons from New Haven, WORKINGUSA: 




controversial, often used zoning tool in New Haven) presented a desirable shift from traditional 
Euclidean zoning towards more flexibility and ad hoc bargaining in planning.9 This paper does 
not focus on whether flexible zoning mechanisms or ad hoc standards embodied in tools like the 
PDD represent a better approach to planning generally. However, it does suggest that flexibility 
may present a good way to achieve greater and more meaningful resident participation in land 
use decision making (a factor which some would certainly argue itself makes for more 
legitimate, democratic, and efficient planning, as Part III outlines). The case studies examined 
here show how flexibility in New Haven’s approach to planning can lead the City and 
communities to collectively craft ad hoc procedures for community engagement that far surpass 
those guaranteed by law.  
However, case studies examined here also caution that New Haven’s flexible planning 
process may disadvantage less sophisticated communities when it comes to participation. The 
current process risks leaving low- income, largely minority communities with relatively minimal 
mechanisms for involvement in land use decisions. Thus, regardless of whether the basic notice 
and hearing requirements established by law are sufficient in terms of participation, and 
regardless of whether one sees as desirable community participation that goes beyond what is 
legally required, New Haven’s openness to ad hoc participation procedures raises important 
equity concerns. But it may also present a call to action to public interest lawyers and community 
activists. New Haven’s approach to planning and participation can clearly lead to significant 
power and engagement for communities ready and willing to push for the kinds of processes they 
want on a project-by-project basis.   
                                                          
9 Shruti Ravikumar Jayaraman, Unplanned Change-Challenging Tradition in Land Use Controls: The Case of New 




II. TRENDS THAT MAKE COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION ESPECIALLY 
RELEVANT TODAY 
A number of trends over the last few decades call for increased community participation in 
the land use approval process. These include the shift towards collaborative urban planning, an 
environmental justice movement pushing for community involvement in development decisions, 
a growing distrust of public-private partnerships, and the emergence of CBAs. On the other 
hand, taking law changes captured by the Supreme Court’s decisions in Nollan and Dolan 
arguably create legal disincentives for local governments to actively foster community 
participation in land development. Therefore, recent changes both within and outside the law 
have complicated and made more salient the question of what local governments should do, as 
well as what they are currently doing, with regards to community participation in local land use 
decisions.  
A. Trends Pushing for Increased Community Participation in Land Use  
Over the last forty years, urban planning has transitioned from a technocratic model to a 
process allowing for increased stakeholder participation.10 Lawrence Susskind, Mieke van der 
Wansem, and Armand Ciccarelli explain that technocratic urban planning, which “is dominated 
by concerns about economic efficiency in the use of space,” shifted from a technocratic model to 
                                                          
10LAWRENCE SUSSKIND ET AL., MEDIATING LAND USE DISPUTES: PROS AND CONS. 2-5 (Ann LeRoyer ed., Lincoln 
Institute of Land Policy 2000). See also Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, Community Benefits Agreements and 
Comprehensive Planning: Balancing Community Empowerment and the Police Power, 18 J.L. & POL'Y 157, 159 
(2009) (Salkin and Lavine point to a shift in urban planning toward “[c]ommunity-based planning efforts…to 
improve the planning process by focusing on small and distinct geographic areas and by developing collaborative 
and inclusive planning programs.”); Craig Anthony Arnold, The Structure of the Land Use Regulatory System in the 
United States, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 441, 476 (2007) (Craig Anthony Arnold reflects this overall shift 
towards more stakeholder participation in land use when acknowledging that “increasingly neighborhood residents 
are actively participating in developing plans and land use regulations for their neighborhoods through techniques 






an advocacy model in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The shift was an effort...to “redistribute 
resources more fairly, increase social equity, and improve quality of life for minority groups and 
the poor.”11 The advocacy model, in turn, led some planners facing escalating land use conflicts 
to a “third planning model based on consensus building and assisted negotiation.”12 This 
mediation model aims to “[e]nsure that the interests of all stakeholders are taken into account 
along with the best possible technical advice.”13 
A growing environmental justice movement has separately increased the importance of 
community participation in planning decisions, at least when they involve environmentally 
worrisome developments. Authors have noted that, ‘“the next frontier for both the 
[environmental justice] movement and the focus of environmental justice scholarship…is land 
use planning.’”14 California, for instance, has been “incorporating environmental justice 
concerns into the local land use planning process,” to “ensur[e] meaningful participation by all 
cross sections of the community…”15 In Connecticut, an environmental justice statute passed in 
2009 reflects this focus on community participation, and, as explained in Section V, has led to a 
unique and substantive form of community participation in New Haven.16  
An expansion of public-private partnerships in local land use has bred distrust of such 
arrangements, which, in turn, has increased efforts to include communities in land use decision 
                                                          
11 SUSSKIND ET AL., supra note 10, at 3-4; See also Salkin & Lavine, supra note 10, at 168.  
 
12 Id. at 5. 
 
13 Id. at 5.  
 
14  Salkin & Lavine, supra note 10, at 175 (quoting Craig Anthony Arnold, Planning Milagros: Environmental 
Justice and Land Use Regulation, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 1 (1998)). 
15 Id. at 175.   
 





making.17 Audrey McFarlane argues that popular sentiment has called for “some external check” 
on these arrangements, especially after the recent Kelo v. City of New London18 decision, which 
she characterizes as possibly “idealistically deferential” to public-private partnerships.19  Indeed, 
McFarlane demonstrates how some courts have held that the deliberations of such partnerships 
must be open to the public. In the case of Baltimore Development Corp. v. Carmel Realty 
Associates, the court required the city’s chief independent economic development arm, the 
Baltimore Development Corporation, “to comply with the Maryland’s Public Information Act 
mandating disclosure in open meetings and disclosure of public information by city and state 
entities.”20  
Finally, the recent rise in agreements between developers and community groups reflects a 
growing interest in new forms of community participation in the land use approval process. 
CBAs “creat[e] a contractual relationship between community organizations and the developer, 
in which the developer agrees to provide designated benefits in exchange for community support 
for the project.”21 McFarlane, in discussing the growing distrust of public-private partnerships 
                                                          
17 In response to the growth of public-private partnerships in inner-city redevelopment efforts, Patience A. Crowder 
argues that “increased formality is needed in the inner-city redevelopment process to achieve significant community 
participation.” Patience A. Crowder, "Ain't No Sunshine": Examining Informality and State Open Meetings Acts As 
the Anti-Public Norm in Inner-City Redevelopment Deal Making, 74 TENN. L. REV. 623, 625 (2007). She believes 
that quasi-public development entities, “market themselves as private entities whose deliberations are not subject to 
open meetings acts.” Id. at 625. Consequently, she sees “the majority of deliberations and decisions concerning 
inner-city redevelopment projects occur[ing] in private.” Id. Crowley proposes two solutions: 1) “the strengthening 
of the text of open meetings acts to require more open meetings, specifically including the meetings of quasi-public 
development entities,” and 2) “the creation and implementation of formal community participation mechanisms by 
local governments.” Id. at 625-26. 
 
18 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 
19 Audrey G. McFarlane, Putting the "Public" Back into Public-Private Partnerships for Economic Development, 30 
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 39, 47 (2007). 
 
20 Id. at 54-55. 
 
21 Scott L. Cummings & Steven A. Boutcher, Mobilizing Local Government Law for Low-Wage Workers, 1 U. CHI. 




sees CBAs as a means to bring in values such as “inclusiveness, transparence, coalition building, 
and clarity of outcomes…” into the land use approval process. 22  Authors also argue that CBAs 
may stem from a desire on the part of the labor movement to make gains outside of more 
traditional union organizing, a general interest in promoting inclusiveness and accountability, 
and the shift previously described from centralized to more community-based planning.23   
The first CBA “emerged in Los Angeles in 2000 as a way to give greater scope for 
community input in redevelopment decision making.”24 A broad coalition of labor and civil 
organizations “used the threat of holding up” a “proposed $1 billion sports and entertainment 
complex” by “contesting environmental and land use approval to negotiate a CBA” with the 
developer.25 A multitude of authors have subsequently shown how it led “to an explosion of 
CBAs around the country,”26 although their emergence has not gone uncriticized. Some contend 
that they inappropriately sidestep the regular planning process, that they may pose exactions 
problems, and that they often unfairly represent various subgroups at the expense of others. 27 
                                                          
22 McFarlane, supra note 19, at 57. 
 
23 See e.g., Cummings, supra note 21 (discussing the rise of CBAs as a response to a stalled or failed labor 
movement); Julian Gross, Community Benefits Agreements: Definitions, Values, and Legal Enforceability, 17 J. 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 35, 37 (2008) (arguing that CBAs can “promote the core values of 
inclusiveness and accountability.”); and Salkin & Lavine, supra note 10, at 168-69 (“The ideals of inclusiveness, 
democracy and public participation remain fundamental to community-based planning, and they have become core 
principles of the community benefits movement as well.”). 
 
24 Cummings, supra note 21, at 206. 
 
25 Id.  
 
26 Id.; See also Vicki Been, Community Benefits Agreements: A New Local Government Tool or Another Variation 
on the Exactions Theme?, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 5, 6 (2010); Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, Understanding 
Community Benefits Agreements: CBAs Have Both Opportunities and Traps for Developers, Municipalities, and 
Community Organizations, PRAC. REAL EST. LAW, July 2008, at 19, 19-20; Gross, supra note 23, at 36. 
 
27 Salkin & Lavine, supra note 10, at 177 (“[T]he CBA contract model allows community coalitions to bypass the 
traditional planning process entirely.”); Id. at 198 (“The CBA has demonstrated that specious appearances of 
community involvement can legitimate departures from the normal planning process when, in fact, the CBA’s effect 
may be to make development projects less accountable, less transparent, and more exclusionary than they would 




But regardless of their validity or wisdom, the spread of these agreements offers yet another way 
in which more community participation has increasingly made its way into the land use approval 
process.  
B. The Takings Doctrine as a Potential Disincentive for Increased Community 
Participation in Land Use 
 In contrast to the various trends pushing for community participation in land use 
processes, the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Nollan and Dolan (as well as increasing 
numbers of state statutes curbing exactions), may, at least theoretically, discourage local 
governments from actively involving the community in their development processes. In general, 
takings law has made local governments more vulnerable to takings challenges.28 Together, 
Nollan and Dolan require exactions to pass essential nexus and proportionality tests. 
For many, Nollan and Dolan also signaled increased scrutiny, if not an actual villainizing 
of local government when it comes to development negotiations.29 Indeed, Lee Ann Fennell 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Together Through Development Agreements and Community Benefit Agreements, 42 IND. L. REV. 227, 254 (2009) 
(Noting that a “pattern of limited community involvement was…seen in the Yankee Stadium CBA, an agreement to 
which no community organizations were parties. Instead, four elected officials signed the agreement on the 
community's behalf…The chairperson of the distribution committee had political ties to several of the signatories, 
and the identities of the rest of the distribution committee have not been publicly disclosed.”); Been, supra note 26 
(raising the possibility that CBAs may pose an unlawful exactions problem as well as discussing the possibility that 
groups negotiating CBAs with developers may not be adequately representative of the community). 
 
28 In Nollan, the Court “held that the California Coastal Commission violated the Fifth Amendment by conditioning 
a building permit for beachfront property on the owners’ dedication of an easement allowing the public to walk on 
the portion of the property nearest the ocean.” Been, supra note 4, at 473 (1991). The Court imposed an “essential 
nexus” test whereby the condition in that case had to “bear an ‘essential nexus’ to the cited harm associated with the 
larger house—a blocked view of the ocean.”  Fennell, supra note 4, at 9. In Dolan, “the city of Tigard attempted to 
condition the grant of a landowner’s request to expand her plumbing store on the dedication of a portion of her land 
for storm drainage and the construction of a bike path.” Id. at 9. But although the court found an essential nexus 
between the conditions and the projected impacts of the expansion, the Court held that “the concessions had not 
been shown to be roughly proportionate to these harms.” Id. 
 
29 “The majority opinion in Dolan does not accuse the city of Tigard of extortion, yet the Court’s insistence on 
detailed proof of the quantity of harm and remediation associated with a particular land use bargain is consistent 





argues that “it is noteworthy that the term used to designate the landowner’s concession in the 
land use bargain –‘exaction’—is not just heavily loaded but is actually a synonym for 
‘extortion.’”30 Therefore, local governments may see Nollan and Dolan as a reason to rethink the 
way they generally negotiate with developers and include the community in those negotiations. 
And some evidence may already exist that Nollan and Dolan can discourage, if not diminish, 
existing community participation in the conditional zoning context. Erin Ryan analyzes a variety 
of anecdotal evidence on the impact of Nollan and Dolan. She points out that at least some 
planners have shifted negotiations with developers over zoning underground as a result of the 
Supreme Court decisions.31 In this scenario, not only will city planners be less inclined to 
develop mechanisms for community participation, but citizens will be less able to monitor 
interactions between developers and the city, much less actually find ways to demand 
participation in that process.32  
 In addition, the academic literature has pointed out that Nollan and Dolan could affect the 
validity of development agreements and even CBAs, not just conditional zoning agreements like 
those involved in the Supreme Court decisions. Development agreements occur when cities grant 
developers a vested right to proceed with a development in return for various community 
                                                          
30 Id.   
 
31 Ryan describes how a planner in Cincinnati, Ohio noticed that the Nollan and Dolan cases drove bargaining 
underground. She states that “rather than meeting with the zoning authority to discuss mutually agreeable solutions 
to a proposed land use requiring permission, developers facing the possibility of a denied permit would now meet 
directly with planning staff, with whom they would create an informal joint proposal that they would later propose 
to the zoning authority on their own initiative.” Erin Ryan, Zoning, Taking, and Dealing: The Problems and Promise 
of Bargaining in Land Use Planning Conflicts, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 337, 367 (2002).  
 
32 Ryan, overall, concludes that “many commentators and practitioners suggest that only marginal changes have 
occurred” after Nollan and Dolan. Id. at 366 (2002). But see Ann E. Carlson & Daniel Pollak, Takings on the 
Ground: How the Supreme Court's Takings Jurisprudence Affects Local Land Use Decisions, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 103, 107 (2001) (“[T]he [takings cases] could have profound implications for land use planning. Developing 
communities may as a result of the decisions engage in more systematic planning, leading them to realize they can 
impose higher, not lower, impact fees. Heavily built out communities with significant unmet infrastructure needs, by 
contrast, may find that the decisions restrict their ability to impose exactions on developers even further. The 




benefits.33 Scholars point out that the Nollan and Dolan limits on negotiated agreements between 
developers and cities do not apply to development agreements because “in most cases, 
development agreements are promises of forbearance from action, rather than promises of action 
on the part of the local government.”34 Nevertheless, others argue that the agreements may be 
susceptible to a takings challenge if the agreements are involuntary or unreasonable.35 Thus, a 
city may not want to create mechanisms for community participation that will expose developers 
to community demands for benefits along with threats of opposition; a developer could 
theoretically allege that that any development agreement arising out of such conditions is 
involuntary.   
In the CBA context, Vicki Been has argued that CBAs could pose an exaction problem, 
although courts have not yet confronted the issue directly.36 She notes that “[i]f the ‘leverage’ 
community groups have to convince developers to enter into negotiations stems from an explicit 
or implicit requirement that the landowner enter into a CBA before seeking government approval 
                                                          
33 Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. & Scott A. Edelstein, Development Agreement Practice in California and Other States, 22 
STETSON L. REV. 761, 762-63 (1993). Additionally, state statues often authorize these agreements in order to avoid 
reserved powers problems as well as “Contract Clause issues that arise when governments attempt to freeze 
regulations.” Frank, supra note 27, at 241 (2009). However, the constitutionality of statutory “development 
agreements has not been ruled on in any published appellate court decision.” Curtin and Edelstein, supra note 33, at 
766. Development agreements are also said to promote flexibility by “allowing terms and conditions that are 
different from and more detailed than the requirements of land development regulations and the statutes authorizing 
them.” JOHN R. NOLON ET AL., LAND USE AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS TEXTBOOK 393 
(Thomson/West 2008) (2008). They bring “certainty by making all elements of the agreement enforceable, against 
the local government as well as the developer.” Id.  
 
34 Frank, supra note 27, at 245. 
 
35 Callies, Curtin, and Tappendorf note that as long as the agreement is voluntary, it appears that local governments 
can go further in what they negotiate than in the traditional conditional zoning scenarios. DAVID L. CALLIES ET AL., 
BARGAINING FOR DEVELOPMENT: A HANDBOOK ON DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS, ANNEXATION AGREEMENTS, 
LAND DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS, VESTED RIGHTS, AND THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC FACILITIES 112 (Environmental 
Law Institute 2003). Moreover, they acknowledge arguments that “exactions agreed to under a voluntary 
development agreement must bear a rational nexus to the needs created by the development” because the ‘rational 
nexus’ and ‘substantial advancement’ standards of Nollan are not limited to just those instances where the 
municipality requires an exaction from an uncooperative landowner.” Id.  
 





of the land use proposal,…courts may view the negotiations as posing no less (and perhaps 
more) risk of ‘extortion,’…than the local government’s processes at issue.”37 And where 
governments actively encourage, and perhaps even aid in the negotiation of, CBAs, Been notes 
that courts could “find sufficient government involvement in the negotiations themselves to 
trigger the legal restrictions that apply to the government.”38 
The possibility that an increased risk of takings challenges will discourage cities from 
promoting or enforcing community participation processes in the land use approval context calls 
for an examination of how cities view community participation and whether they are, in fact, 
responding to Nollan and Dolan in this manner. This essay’s assessment of community 
participation in New Haven’s land use approval process aims, in part, to identify whether at least 
one city considers takings law in crafting mechanisms for community participation within the 
approval process.  
III. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THEORY ON COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN 
LAND USE 
Political theorists, urban planners, and scholars offer a variety of theoretical and practical 
reasons why the land use approval process should make room for community participation. This 
essay attempts only to give just enough of a summary of this complex and growing literature in 
order to better understand why New Haven may want to include communities in its land use 
decision-making. Among the theoretical or normative discussions are ideas about democratic 
legitimacy as tied to participatory processes, the historical and cultural basis for participation at 
the local level, and normative theories about empowerment or protection of marginalized groups. 
                                                          
37 Id.   
 




The more practical justifications for community participation in the land use context emphasize 
the ability of community participation processes to improve long-term planning and efficiency. 
Arguments against more robust community participation processes, however, emphasize 
competitive federalism, costs, and questions about what constitutes “community” or what make s 
a group “representative.” 
A. Theoretical Justifications for Community Participation 
Democratic discourse theory offers one way in which academics view participation as a 
means of promoting democratic legitimacy. The theory presents a “process ‘solution’” to a 
perceived increase in the complexity of “modern social and legal problems [that] no longer lend 
themselves to easy two-sided contested positions for resolution.”39  The theory is premised on 
the notion that communication, dialogue and deliberation by constituencies, citizens, voters, and 
decision makers will produce better and more legitimate outcomes. 
Others who focus on local government and land development have emphasized how 
direct community participation in local government decision-making reflects a historically 
persistent and fundamental notion of American democracy. Alan Altshuler, for example, 
examined community participation in the form of increased control over decision-making in poor 
black neighborhoods in the 1970s. He noted and traced how “[t]he strong preference of 
Americans for political decentralization has…shaped a good deal of the nation’s history.”40 
McFarlane, in attempting to derive justification for community participation in land 
development, also acknowledges how direct participation appeals to a culturally ingrained notion 
                                                          
39 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer's Role(s) in Deliberative Democracy, 5 NEV. L.J. 347, 352 (2005). 
 
40 ALAN A. ALTSHULER, COMMUNITY CONTROL: THE BLACK DEMAND FOR PARTICIPATION IN LARGE AMERICAN 





of democracy in how it represents “the most direct analogue to the New England town meeting 
that often serves as the rhetorical justification for direct democracy and our normative vision of 
government.”41  
Finally, in addition to ideas of democratic legitimacy and the nature of American 
democracy, authors often point out how community participation in today’s land use decision-
making process can or should counter elite and private interests otherwise favored by the 
process. Some explicitly call for community participation as a way to empower marginalized 
communities to resist the prevailing power imbalance. Others more generally acknowledge a 
power imbalance and see community participation as a way to counter it. Others still do not 
explicitly espouse empowerment theories, but raise third party-related concerns that support an 
empowerment basis for greater community participation.  
McFarlane has analyzed instrumental, democratic or process-based, and empowerment 
justifications for community participation in development. In discussing instrumental theories of 
community participation (which refer to how participation can yield administrative efficiency), 
McFarlane states that to the extent that “participants bring goals to the table that are inconsistent 
with the pre-defined and privatized goals of development, the process will either stop or the 
inconsistent goals will be discarded as irrational, impractical, or simply undesirable.”42 For her, 
“the greatest problem for instrumental theories in justifying participation as a goal is their over-
reliance on extrinsic justifications of bureaucratic rationality that fail to acknowledge the 
intrinsic value of community participation for the participants, regardless of efficient or rational 
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outcomes.”43 For McFarlane, democratic participation theories alone, on the other hand, fail to 
take into account that “discourse usually marginalizes those who do not talk or those who talk in 
marginalized ways.”44  
Ultimately, McFarlane argues that “empowerment or political control theory” offers the 
best justification for community participation in the land use approval process. Assuming 
conflicting interests amongst disparately powerful groups in land development, not just 
community participation, but meaningful participation, presents a possible form of resistance for 
disadvantaged groups.45 She even proposes a scheme for achieving “meaningful” participation. It 
requires: 1) that local government include community participants in the development decision-
making process early so as to allow them to shape the goals of development in the first place; 2) 
an “enforcement mechanism” for failing to follow its procedures; and 3) that local governments 
should not wait to devolve decision-making power to communities only when development 
projects arise – they should “allow community participation and education in the business of 
community-decision making on real decisions regularly.”46 
Craig Anthony Arnold, in examining criticisms of the current land use regulatory system, 
also acknowledges power imbalance. He notes how the land use regulatory system may be unfair 
in how it is “controlled by dominant groups in society, especially non-Hispanic whites, wealthy 
development and business interests, and high-income communities.”47 He cites a variety of 
authors who “point to examples of racism, class bias, and exercise of power by elites in land use 
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policies and patterns.”48And although he does not push for a normative or empowerment-based 
theory of community participation, he views increased use of community participation as a way 
in which the land use regulatory system can and does mediate the imbalance of power.49   
Finally, the fact that negotiations between developers and governments may implicate 
third party rights points in favor of increased community participation in the land use approval 
process. In discussing the pros and cons of the Nollan and Dolan nexus and proportionality tests, 
Fennell points out that the tests could help prevent local government from engaging in 
conditional zoning bargains that “unfairly burden a group within the community.”50 In other 
words, she points out the vulnerability of third parties to negotiations between developers.51 
Indeed, presumably in response to this concern (at least in part), some states have required public 
hearings before approving development agreements.52 
B. Practical Justifications for Community Participation 
                                                          
48 Id.  
49 Id. at 476-77. 
 
50 Fennell, supra note 4, at 54. 
51 More generally, authors like Richard Epstein have prompted scholars to question the legitimacy of exactions 
because of their potential violation of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Epstein acknowledges potential 
problems with the implication of third party rights in a government’s negotiations with private parties in his thinking 
on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. He notes, for example, that “conditions will not be imposed if everyone 
is hurt equally by them, but they may become part of a system of contracts or grants if they work to the benefit of a 
dominant faction and against the interests of others.” Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, 
and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 23-24 (1988). Lee Anne Fennel and Vicki Been present two 
examples of authors incorporating Epstein’s ideas on third parties in their own thinking on exactions. See Fennell, 
supra note 4; Been, supra note 4.  
52  David L. Callies & Julie A. Tappendorf, Unconstitutional Land Development Conditions and the Development 





Authors often cite community participation as a practical tool in land-use decision-making. 
Some tout community participation’s ability to ensure a “better” long-term vision as well as a 
greater chance of success for a particular project or decision. Others point to potential cost 
benefits and overall administrative efficiency as reasons for more community participation. 
One criticism of practices associated with increasingly common bi-lateral agreements 
between cities and developers is that such practices allow planners to ignore long-term impacts 
of their decisions. Alejandro Camacho, for example, notes that “[w]hile negotiation-based 
regimes do reject the unworkably rigid, detailed plans at the core of traditional planning, these 
new regimes have largely failed to produce planning alternatives that take into consideration 
long-term and cumulative impacts.”53 He argues that a “collaborative land use model” could 
address this long-term vision problem.54 His proposed model calls for stronger democratic 
institutions through broad and meaningful participation in agreement negotiation, as well as 
sustained problem solving, rather than [an] adversarial, approach.”55 Cities under the model are 
to become organizers, facilitators, information gatherers, and distributors.56  
Frank’s analysis of development agreements, on the other hand, argues that “concerted” 
efforts to involve the community in development projects can also help developers avoid some of 
the risks associated with “shifting political attitudes to a project.”57 He implies that more 
community involvement in a Florida development could have countered “mounting political 
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pressure” against the project which eventually led the zoning commission to change its mind on 
proposed rezoning and subsequently disavow the development agreement that had been signed 
between the city and the developer.58 
In addition to improving the success of development projects in the long-run, authors point 
out that community participation in the land use decision-making process can yield more 
efficient results by allowing parties to lower transaction costs and promoting administrative 
efficiency. Various authors promote mediation models as a means of avoiding the delays and 
costs associated with litigation in land use disputes.59  For others, community participation in 
development can “promote administrative efficiency” by “facilitating information gathering” and 
creating a “political feed-back mechanism.”60  
C. Arguments Against Community Participation 
 But despite the many reasons outlined above for encouraging community participation in 
land use decision making that goes beyond mere notice of zoning hearings, strong 
counterarguments exist. The need for cities to compete for investment dollars, costs associated 
with participatory processes, and the difficulty of pinning down what community participation 
actually means constitute only a few of those arguments. For example, in a twist to the Tiebout 
hypothesis, empirical evidence suggests that cities compete amongst themselves for development 
dollars. Tiebout’s hypothesis generally argues that city residents will lead to an efficient 
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provision of services by their city because residents will “vote with their feet” and lead cities to 
compete with other cities.61 
Under a theory of competitive federalism, “competition among and within governments and 
between a government and private parties serves as a significant constraint upon the behavior of 
the politicians and bureaucrats who make up the government.”62 Been argues that communities 
face competition when imposing exactions, in part, because they must compete with other 
municipalities in attracting developers.63 She cites empirical and anecdotal evidence showing 
cities reducing or configuring their exactions in order to create favorable “development 
climate[s].” 64  If one analogizes local government-imposed community participation procedures 
to impact fees or other exactions that impose costs on developers, competitive federalism 
presents a reason why cities should not and will not impose time and cost-intensive community 
participation mechanisms on developers.  
Authors alternately point to the costs associated with implementing community participation 
processes as a reason to avoid more robust participation. Arnold points out that persons seeking 
to minimize transaction costs in land development already critique the existing planning, zoning, 
and permitting steps that call for “highly public, participatory, and time-consuming processes.”65 
And Camacho, even while proposing a new “collaborative land use model,” acknowledges that 
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costs may be a challenge to adopting “institutional processes designed to facilitate collaborative 
land use decisionmaking.”66 He also acknowledges the obvious difficulty in assessing 
“whether…increased costs yield better agreements.”67 Indeed, McFarlane points out that the 
delay and disruptions inevitably linked to increased community participation require “us to look 
beyond instrumental justifications that are otherwise so appealing.”68  
Moreover, much disagreement exists regarding what constitutes community, adequate 
representation of communities, and the ideal form for participation. With regards to who or what 
constitutes “community,” one could argue that the type of interest an individual has in a 
particular land use project should determine the extent of that individual’s participation in the 
land use approval process and thus determine membership in the “community” targeted for 
“community participation.” Camacho proposes, for example, that individuals’ “participatory 
right” in his collaborative model should depend on “the type of interest that the actor has in the 
project.”69 He notes that “citizens with only generalized interests in a project” should be 
provided with various types of information, but they should “not be given extensive power over a 
project decision.”70 Entities significantly affected, on the other hand, are to “be actively included 
in early scoping meetings and negotiations to identify potential issues and project alternatives.”71 
In addition, Camacho proposes that the more flexible the regulatory regime at issue, the more 
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“heightened” the participation should be throughout the process.72 However, even if one were to 
accept Camacho’s framework as adequate for determining who participates and how, one would 
still have to ask, among other things, whether an individual’s interest in a project should be 
analyzed objectively or subjectively.  
But Camacho’s focus on the legitimacy of an individual’s interest in the decision making 
process at issue is only one approach to the question of who constitutes (or should constitute) 
community for purposes of community participation. The literature shows a multitude of often 
incompatible views on who should form part of the “community” in participatory processes. 
Altshuler, for instance, in his 1970s discussion of power and community participation in cities, 
pointed to a distinction between community and neighborhoods, arguing that neighborhoods 
should be the focus of efforts to increase community participation in cities.73  
Nevertheless, assuming one could definitively identify a group of individuals as a legitimate 
“community” that should engage in decision making over a specific development project, it is 
unclear when or how individuals associated with that group adequately represent the 
community’s interests. As Frank pointed out in his overview of CBAs, elected officials may not 
always constitute legitimate representatives.74 The case studies in Part V sometimes reflect a 
similar distrust of elected neighborhood representatives in New Haven.  Others have noted that 
community participation through CBAs, “[b]ecause of their targeted focus,…divert[s] 
resources…at the expense of the larger community.”75 Thus, the interests of a few groups or a 
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broad coalition, even if adequately represented, could fail to represent the interests of the larger 
community, as a whole. Academics, like those cited here, repeatedly point to these definitional 
problems but eschew an attempt to systematically and broadly assess or critique how the 
academic literature conceives of community or representation in land use community 
participation.  
Finally, the answer to what constitutes adequate or meaningful participation in land use 
decision making is no clearer than the answer to who constitutes community or legitimate 
representatives. Authors invoke terms like “collaborative,” “consensus,” “majority decision 
rule,” and “deliberation” in describing current efforts or theories to increase community 
participation in land use beyond the usual notice and hearing requirements for the various 
theoretical and practical reasons outlined above.76 Some go so far as to propose specific 
guidelines for community participation, such as McFarlane’s three requirements also described 
above.  However, each author generally seems to rely only on a vague notion of participation 
which sheds little, if any, light on the specific processes such participation should follow.  
Nevertheless, while the questions of who constitutes community, who legitimately represents 
a community, and what community participation should entail remain ambiguous and contested, 
these are not questions this paper must fully resolve to examine in a useful manner the way that 
community participation functions in New Haven. By broadly asking how residents participate in 
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76 See, e.g., Camacho supra note 53, at 317 (“An additional challenge in implementing a collaborative model is 
determining whether, and in what circumstances, to require project agreements to be adopted by consensus. 
Some…claim that consensus ‘is not necessary because the benefits attributed to consensus-based processes can be 
obtained from other forms of public participation which do not revolve around a quest for consensus.”); Id. 
(“[O]thers assert that a majority decision rule is preferable to consensus because consensus encourages holdouts and 
mutual vetoes that can result in the underutilization of resources.”); Salkin & Lavine, supra note 10, at 172 (noting 
how The American Planning Association’s Growing Smart Legislative Guidebook adopts a recommendation that 
planning “should be engaging citizens positively at all steps in the planning process, acknowledging and responding 
to their comments and concerns”); Arnold, supra note 10, at 501 (noting that “the combination of politics, social 
norms, statutory ‘open government’ requirements, and democratic principles put strong pressure on land use 




the City’s land use approval process, this paper aims to better understand who is participating in 
this process across different types of projects and neighborhoods, if community participates at 
all. This basic type of assessment is entirely missing from the existing literature on New Haven 
and little is known about the way communities participate across projects in other cities. Only by 
first understanding how communities actually participate and how a City crafts and understands 
processes for participation can one transition to a more normative discussion of how the City 
should structure participation processes and/or who constitutes legitimate communities and 
representatives in the land use context. This paper only purports to start such a conversation by 
undertaking a mainly positive account of what happens in New Haven and using it to better 
situate the city within land use trends. 
IV. FORMAL PROCESSES FOR COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN NEW 
HAVEN’S LAND USE APPROVAL PROCESS 
Before delving into how community participation functions in New Haven’s land use 
approval process, it is necessary to understand the formal community participation mechanisms 
or requirements imposed on New Haven’s planners. I begin with an examination of current 
federal requirements. I then analyze a variety of state land use statutes in order to better 
understand how they may facilitate or perhaps impede more “meaningful” community 
participation. With McFarlane’s requirements for “meaningful” participation in mind, the 
succeeding discussions will generally conceive of “meaningful” participation as a means by 
which community groups and residents can engage in the land use approval early on and with 
some degree of influence or bargaining power. Finally, I examine New Haven’s municipal 
regulations on zoning to understand how they reflect or counter state and federal laws’ approach 





Federal law requires community participation in the local land use approval process in two 
main ways. First, under Housing and Urban Development (HUD) guidelines, housing authorities 
must “engage in ‘meaningful’ community participation in the planning of…HOPE VI 
communities.”77 Second, under the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1984: Domestic 
Housing and International Recovery and Financial Stability Act, HUD may not authorize the 
“demolition or sale of any public housing unless the Housing Authority’s application ‘has been 
developed in consultation with tenants and tenant councils.’”78 However, these requirements for 
meaningful participation are not defined in any real detail and scholars generally agree that they 
amount to relatively toothless requirements.79 Indeed, these federal meaningful participation 
requirements are understood to represent a low point in a long history of federally mandated 
community participation in urban redevelopment.80 
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79 Id. (“Although empowered by the consultation requirement, housing authorities and tenants continue to struggle 
with the appropriate parameters of ‘consultation.’ HUD promulgated new tenant consultation regulations in 1985, 
but they did not clarify the meaning of ‘appropriate tenant consultation.’”); Barbara L. Bezdek, To Attain "The Just 
Rewards of So Much Struggle": Local-Resident Equity Participation in Urban Revitalization, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
37, 57-58 (2006) (quoting McFarlane, supra note 41, at 870) (“The procedures of public programs invite grass-roots 
input in theory, but the features of such systems are subject to the critique of being solely smoke and mirrors. 
Federal urban policy has required cities to involve affected residents in development decisions since the community 
devastations of Urban Renewal in the 1950s. As a result traditional local land use planning, development and 
environmental management all include participatory mechanisms. In practice, however, such requirements have 
tended to ‘rubber stamp’ . . . [those] urban redevelopment decisions that had already been made by the local 
government.”).  
 
80 In the 1950s, urban renewal initially did not consult citizens unless “the aims of the more ‘efficient’ 
administration would also be served.” Barlow Burke, Jr., The Threat to Citizen Participation in Model Cities, 56 
Cornell L. Rev. 751, 754 (1970-1971). However, as more citizens began to protest displacement and relocation, 
government began to “recognize a need for more direct participation.” Id. at 754. According to Burke, “[t]he War on 
Poverty of the mid-and late- 1960s and the establishment of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) with its 
funding of Community Action Programs (CAP) in the various pockets of poverty throughout the country, 





Arguably, Connecticut statutes concerning project-specific land use issues like variances (as 
opposed to actions involving long-term planning like the development of a comprehensive plan) 
do little to foster meaningful community engagement and participation in the land use approval 
process. However, two land use-related statutes targeting low-income communities mandate 
unique processes that support meaningful participation in land use approval for those groups. 
More specifically, this section looks at state statutes regarding notice, state statutes affecting 
public access to zoning applications requiring zoning board or commission approval, and two 
other state statutes that notably affect the way communities interact with the land use approval 
process, namely: 1) the Revitalization Zone statute; and 2) the 2009 Environmental Justice 
statute.  
In assessing how a basic land use statute may encourage or undermine meaningful 
participation, as characterized in the first part of this section, I make four assumptions: First, 
because residents wishing to oppose or support any type of zoning plan or development project 
require time to organize and/or develop a response that may require consultation with a lawyer, 
the more advance notice of a hearing required by statute, the greater the likelihood that residents 
will be able to meaningfully participate in that hearing and thus meaningfully participate in the 
overall process. Second, access to zoning applications by residents and neighborhood 
                                                                                                                                                                             
became an end unto itself rather than a means for bureaucrats to simplify the administration of specific programs.” 
Id. In 1966, the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act passed, expressing a “somewhat cautious, 
careful concern for citizen participation and community action.” Id. at 760. This approach, commonly referred to as 
Model Cities, sought to transition from the encouragement of direct democracy in the OEO program to “one of 
sharing power between citizens and local government.” Id. at 762. In 1974, however, Model Cities and urban 
renewal terminated with the Housing and Community Development Act’s Community Development Block Grant 
program. FAINSTEIN ET AL., RESTRUCTURING THE CITY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF URBAN REDEVELOPMENT 18 
(Irene Rockwood, ed. Longman 1983). Like CAP and Model Cities, CDBG contained a community participation 
component. However, the CDBG legislation “was completely vague as to how this [community participation] 
process should be set up.” Id. at 21. Over time, “substantial compliance with the participatory mechanisms has 





representatives is important for any degree of organizing or otherwise educated and meaningful 
response to a particular zoning issue.81 Third, the more personalized the notice required by 
statute, the more likely residents are to actually receive notice of a zoning application or 
development project and thus be able to respond in a meaningful way.  
In looking at state notice of hearing requirements, the statutes generally provide notice to 
residents twice, but no more than two weeks prior to the required public hearing.82 If one 
considers that organizing support or opposition of a development plan might require residents to 
organize community meetings, research complex land use and legal issues, and perhaps even 
retain counsel, two weeks seems to offer an unrealistic time frame for organizing successful 
                                                          
81 Indeed, in two of the four case studies examined in this paper, community residents argued before the City Plan 
Commission, New Haven’s main zoning decision making body, as well as the Board of Aldermen, that they had not 
received sufficient notice of the applications at issue to gather expert testimony or otherwise fully evaluate them. In 
the case of the School of Management expansion, for example, Anstress Farwell, a leader of the Urban Design 
League, a group active around design and planning, spoke out before the City’s Board of Aldermen Legislation 
Committee, faulting the “hearing process[,] saying she had insufficient time to organize expert witnesses. She added 
that changes were made which were not available to her until the hearing.” In response, the committee’s chairman 
“stated that the changes were not substantive and that the notice complied with state and local law.” New Haven 
Board of Aldermen, Journal of the Board of Aldermen Legislation Committee 3 (Jan. 28, 2010),  available at 
http://legsvcs.cityofnewhaven.com/meetings/2010%5C1/1118_M_Legislation_Committee_10-01-
28_Journal_of_the_Board_of_Aldermen.pdf. Similarly, community members voiced concerns that neighborhood 
residents had not had an opportunity to review the PDD plans at issue in the Science Park development. State Rep. 
Gary Holder-Windfied, who lives a block away from the Science Park development asked at a City Plan 
Commission meeting, “If the community doesn’t have the actual plans, what’s the point of testifying?” Thomas 
MacMillan, Amid Barbs, Winchester Project Advances, NEW HAVEN INDEPENDENt, July 22, 2010, 
http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/winchester_factory_re-do_under_fire/.  In that case 
City Plan director, Karyn Gilvarg explained that the plans had “been…available for public viewing in the 
department’s offices in City Hall.” Id. Such a reply, in turn, prompts the question of whether even good advance 
availability of zoning applications and plans in City Hall offices alone, despite a neighborhood’s lack of 
sophistication and perhaps more complicated transportation barriers, constitutes adequate access.   
 
82 Section 8-7d of the Connecticut General Statutes lays out frequently used hearing and notice requirements. 
Section 8-7d requires a public hearing within sixty-five days after receipt of any “formal petition, application, 
request or appeal” to a “zoning commission, planning and zoning commission or zoning board of appeals,” which 
covers zoning. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-7d (2011). The hearing under §8-7d is generally completed within thirty-five 
days after it commences. Id. With regards to notice, §8-7d requires that notice of the hearing be published in a 
“newspaper having a general circulation in such municipality where the land that is the subject of the hearing is 
located at least twice, at intervals of not less than two days.” Id. Under the statute, residents get no more than fifteen 
days notice and no less than two days notice of a hearing, although municipalities may add to these notice 
requirements by regulation.82 Section 8-7d provides that “a zoning commission, planning commission or planning 
and zoning commission shall establish a public notice registry of landowners, electors, and nonprofit 
organizations….requesting notice.”82 Notice to those included in the registry must issue “not later than seven days 





support or opposition.83 And while municipalities may add to the state notice requirements, it is 
notable that state law does not mandate notice to owners of property adjacent to a site involved 
in a zoning decision. In theory, the statute requires a resident to constantly scour the pages of the 
local newspaper for notice of upcoming hearings on proposed developments for his or her 
neighborhood, a seemingly high bar for even the most basic kind of participation.  
With regards to access to applications or petitions for zoning changes on the part of 
developers, it appears that a developer could technically delay the filing of such materials with 
the town clerk until ten days or even fewer days prior to the required hearing, depending on the 
type of zoning involved. 84 Even if an interested resident had the sophistication to know that such 
materials would be available, as well as the means and expertise to get to city hall and interact 
with the bureaucracy there, the fact that he or she does not have a statutory right to the 
                                                          
83 In contrast,  notice and posting (i.e. filing with the town clerk) requirements for zoning matters involving city-led, 
long-term planning require more advance notice and public availability of related documents. For example, §8-23 
addresses the preparation, amendment or adoption of a plan of conservation and development. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 
8-23 (2011). Section 8-23 requires two separate newspaper notices about a required hearing no sooner than fifteen 
days and no later than two days. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 8-23(g)(6) (2011). Notably, it specifies that such notice “shall 
make reference to the filing of [the draft plan] in the office of the town clerk.” Id. It also requires that the draft plan 
be shared with the legislative body of the municipality sixty five days prior to the public hearing by the commission. 
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 8-23(g)(2) (2011). Moreover, the plan must be posted on the city’s website and filed with the 
town clerk at least thirty five days prior to the commission hearing. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-23(g)(3) (2011); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 8-23(g)(5) (2011). Section 8-127 addresses the preparation and approval of redevelopment plans. It 
requires newspaper notice of the required public hearing at least two weeks in advance. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 8-127(b) 
(2011).  It also requires that plans be published on a municipal website at least thirty five days before a public 
hearing. Id.  Section 8-191 addresses the adoption of development plans. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-191 (2011). In 
adopting a development plan, the municipality’s development agency proposing the plan must issue newspaper 
notice no more than three weeks and no less than one week in advance of the hearing. Conn. Gen. Stat § 8-191(a) 
(2011). The development agency must also post the plan on the city’s website, if any, at least thirty five days prior to 
the development agency hearing. Id. Certainly, the increased notice involved in these “city-led” planning issues 
makes sense when one considers that the city’s proposals for redevelopment, development, and other similar plans 
involve large-scale changes to a city’s land use policies and long-term plans. Nevertheless, they illustrate at least a 
few mechanisms for notice to the community that would seem to encourage more meaningful oversight or 
participation in contrast to the statutes applying to potentially more routine variances, site plans, exemptions, and 
zoning regulation changes. 
 
84 Under §8-7d, “[a]ll applications and maps and documents” relating to “any formal petition, application, request, 
or appeal” to a “zoning commission, planning and zoning commission, or zoning board of appeals” shall be open for 
public inspection.”Id. However, §8-7d does not specify how far in advance. Id. Proposed changes to zoning 
regulations and boundaries follows §8-7d with the additional requirement that the proposed changes must be filed 
with the town, city or borough clerk (or with the district clerk and the town clerk in the case of a district) “at least 




documents more than ten days in advance (and perhaps even less) could make it difficult to craft 
an educated response to a developer’s application in time for the hearing. Communicating the 
plans to other community members who would be interested in a particular hearing if they knew 
the content of a specific developer application would also be difficult in the short amount of time 
guaranteed by statute between the filing of the application and hearing.  
In addition, a state statute allows municipalities, by ordinance, to establish procedures for 
holding only one public hearing on “any application for a proposal that requires approval by 
more than one municipal agency, body, commission, or committee.”85 Use of such a statute 
could significantly reduce opportunities for community oversight of and engagement in the 
process. Rather than have multiple opportunities to learn about a particular development and 
perhaps form opposition along the line of multiple approvals sometimes required for zoning 
changes, community residents would only have one opportunity to participate in the approval 
process, assuming no subsequent legal challenges.   
On the other hand, the state has created two other formal mechanisms for community 
participation that fall outside of the blanket provisions for the land use approval process and 
represent relatively unique and robust mechanisms for community involvement in land use 
decisions: 1) neighborhood revitalization zones; and 2) an environmental justice law. The 
Connecticut legislature authorized municipalities in 1995 to establish neighborhood 
revitalization zones. These zones would establish a “collaborative process for federal, state and 
local governments to revitalize neighborhoods where there is a significant number of deteriorated 
property and property that has been foreclosed, is abandoned, blighted or is substandard or poses 
                                                          
 





a hazard to public safety.”86 According to the Neighborhood Revitalization Zone Strategic Plan 
Guidelines issued by the Connecticut Office of Policy and Management, “[t]he main benefits of 
this program are related to bringing all stakeholders together to plan a neighborhood that works 
for all of them, by-passing "red tape" that might impede attempts to revitalize the neighborhood, 
and establishing a more flexible and creative government response to the needs of 
communities.”87 Thus, the zones aim to establish community participation processes that exceed 
what is statutorily required in ordinary planning.  
The Environmental Justice law adopted in 2009 recognizes a number of low income towns 
and neighborhoods throughout the state as “environmental justice communities.” Such 
communities are either defined by statute as a census block group of low income individuals or 
as a distressed municipality.88  Major polluters applying for a permit from the Department of 
Environmental Protection or the Siting Council are required to “file a meaningful public 
participation plan” with the approving state council or department and obtain “approval of such 
plan prior to filing any application for such permit, certificate or approval.”89 Moreover, such 
polluters must also “consult with the chief elected official or officials of the town or towns in 
which the affecting facility is to be located or expanded to evaluate the need for a community 
environmental benefit agreement.”90 Thus, the statute sets up a framework that notably aims to 
                                                          
86 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-600(a) (2011).  
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bring in low-income community members into permitting decisions and their associated land-use 
processes in a deliberate and potentially meaningful way. It significantly surpasses the basic 
notice requirements that apply to zoning applications submitted by developers to the appropriate 
planning bodies.  
C. New Haven’s Local Laws 
For the most part, New Haven’s regulations follow the state’s requirements closely. A few 
instances where New Haven exceeds the state standards can be found in the following situations: 
1) the alteration of zoning regulations, a process which also governs the PDD approval process; 
2) the process surrounding variances; and 3) the approval process for site plans. In addition, the 
City has previously publicly supported CBAs and has created a Revitalization Zone.  
Procedures for adopting or amending zoning regulations or maps generally follow the state 
hearing and notice requirements. However, they require approval by New Haven’s Board of 
Aldermen, in addition to the usual approval by the zoning commission, which is referred to in 
New Haven as the City Plan Commission (CPC).91 Approval at the Board of Aldermen requires 
a public hearing at the Legislation Committee and a separate public hearing before the full 
Board.92 Approval of PDDs or planned development units (PDUs), flexible albeit often 
controversial zoning tools, occurs in the same manner as proposals for the amendment of the 
zoning ordinances or boundaries. But while this process adds significantly to opportunities for 
public hearing and participation by extending the approval process and subjecting it to the full 
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city legislature, it does not set New Haven apart from other cities. The process is generally the 
same in other jurisdictions.93 
The regulations on zoning variances add notably to the state requirements with regards to 
public notice. In addition to newspaper notice, the board of zoning appeals, which is responsible 
for variances, must notify adjacent property owners (“within and including a distance of 200 
feet” from the property at issue) and aldermen of the “ward or wards in which the subject 
property and the properties within and including a distance of 200 feet are located” at least seven 
days prior to the date of the hearing.94 Additionally, a sign must be posted on the subject 
property at least fourteen days prior to the public hearing with some minimum information 
regarding the hearing and sources of additional information.95 
With regards to site plans, the city zoning regulations state that the CPC “may hold a public 
hearing regarding any site proposal if, in its judgment, the specific circumstances require such 
action.”96 State statutes do not require public hearing for site plans that do not involve zoning 
changes that normally require a hearing. The local regulations also call for notice of any public 
hearing scheduled for a site plan, which includes a summary of the application, to “abutting 
property owners and property owners within 200 feet of the property borders” no more than 14 
days and no less than 7 days prior to the public hearing.97 Thus it goes beyond the state statute by 
explicitly allowing the CPC to hold such a hearing and making notice for such an optional 
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hearing more personalized and detailed that state statute would normally require for zoning 
changes.98  
Separately, the Board of Aldermen passed a Resolution in 2004 which encouraged CBAs. It 
“strongly urge[d] developers and other entities undertaking development, including but not 
limited to city, state and federal projects, to negotiate community benefits agreements with 
representative community organizations; where community benefits include but are not restricted 
to voluntary payments-in-lieu-of-taxes, living wage jobs, environmental safeguards, local hiring 
and training, direct benefits to local schools, affordable housing construction, neighborhood 
preservation and community stabilization, park and recreation space, residential parking and 
responsible contracting, charitable giving, and cultural amenities.”99 However, the Resolution is 
now viewed as largely symbolic and responsive only to pressures in 2004 from community 
groups wanting a controversial cancer center development to enter into a community benefits 
agreement; it is not considered binding on the current Board of Aldermen.100 
Finally, in 2000, New Haven created a Revitalization Zone in the West River 
neighborhood.101 The neighborhood is an economically struggling area with a largely minority, 
black population.102 Kevin Ewing, an organizer in the neighborhood, described the zone as a way 
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to bring development of the area “in-house,” meaning that neighborhood residents could develop 
their own planning process.103 Despite attempts to develop the area, however, Ewing notes that 
little has occurred since the City established the Zone.104 
Thus, New Haven’s local notice requirements exceed the state requirements (albeit not 
dramatically by any means) in at least three ways. First, New Haven’s requirements for 
amending zoning text/maps and forming PDDs or PDUs stand add significantly to the state 
requirements for notice and hearings in the land use approval process. Second, the City surpasses 
the state’s minimum notice requirements by requiring personalized notice required for variances, 
as well as a sign visible to residents passing by a property asking for a variance. Third, the City 
exceeds the state minimum requirements by allowing public hearings for site plans and requiring 
more detailed notice. Outside of notice requirements, the City has shown interest in supporting a 
planning process that goes even beyond making notice requirements slightly better by voicing 
support for CBAs and by voluntarily creating a Revitalization Zone.  On the other hand, New 
Haven’s requirements for changing zoning text or maps (including PDD applications) do not 
stand out when compared to cities across the nation generally. Its resolution in support of CBAs 
is now only a symbolic gesture of the past. And finally, the main formal process by which New 
Haven sets itself apart and perhaps ahead of other cities when it comes to community 
participation, the Revitalization Zone, is a voluntary, state-created process that at least one 
community organizer claims has not accomplished much, if anything, in the last ten years. And 
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although some cities across the nation have begun to craft local ordinances specifically 
promoting increased or meaningful participation, New Haven lacks any such laws.105 
V. FOUR CASE STUDIES 
The following section aims to create something of a snapshot of community participation in 
New Haven’s land use approval process. Early interviews with city planners and development 
officials indicated that the city views community participation in projects differently depending 
on the extent to which a particular development is considered public or private.106 In general, a 
city owned and developed property will prompt planners and officials to engage the community 
more proactively than a purely privately owned and developed project. The case studies selected 
cover the scale between those extremes through: 1) a public development (the Worthington 
Hooker school expansion); 2) a public-private development (Science Park); and 3) a private 
development (the Yale School of Management expansion, albeit the owner Yale constitutes an 
unusual private owner as a repeat and highly visible community player). The fourth case study 
also fits into the “private” category, but it was mainly chosen because it represents the first time 
New Haven has dealt with the 2009 state Environmental Justice statute that aims for more 
meaningful community participation when major polluters seek to expand their facilities.  
Additionally, and perhaps notably for some, this paper does not examine the 2006 CBA 
signed between the City and the Yale- New Haven Cancer Center, New Haven’s first CBA.  
Much has been written on the 2006 CBA. For example, articles have examined the role of labor, 
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the difficulties enforcing the terms of the agreement, and the fact that community groups did not 
sign onto the agreement, making their ability to challenge subsequent actions by the signatories 
more difficult.107  But this paper did not want to risk focusing too much on a development that 
may have ultimately represented a complete outlier in terms of how community normally 
participates in the land use approval process. Instead, it sought to look beyond the 2006 CBA to 
provide a more complete and current picture of community participation in New Haven’s land 
use approval process.  
Although each case study will gradually introduce individual actors, neighborhoods, and city 
departments, understanding the basic function of the following entities will help one navigate the 
subsequent case studies:  
1) The City Plan Department (CPD): In general, the CPD is comprised of planners 
“hired by the mayor who play an advisory role to the City Plan Commission (CPC) on 
technical planning and zoning matters.”108  
2) City Plan Commission (CPC): The CPC is “comprised of six voting laypeople—one 
elected representative from the Board of Aldermen, four permanent mayoral 
appointees, and one of the three appointed alternates who rotate to fill the final slot.” 
Members are usually “selected according to political favor based on the mayor’s, an 
alderman’s, or the CPD’s suggestion.”109 
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3) The Economic Development Administration (EDA): The EDA generally works to 
attract development to the city, assist developers “in identifying funding sources, 
making applications to public and private lenders, and complying with regulatory, 
statutory, or other permitting requirements,” and secure federal and state grants for 
economic development.110  
4) The Board of Aldermen: The Board of Aldermen is the City’s legislative and elected 
body comprised of 30 aldermen representing 30 wards.111  
5) Community Management Teams: Community Management Teams “are organized in 
each of New Haven's ten community policing districts.” The Teams consists of 
residents and businesses interested in tackling neighborhood problems and addressing 
neighborhood issues. They are intended to help “residents have a voice in 
neighborhood improvement and revitalization efforts and are an important link to the 
police and to other city and social service agencies.”112 The groups meet monthly with 
police officers and other officials at police substations.113 Members are volunteers and 
do not have formal power in land use decision making or other areas.114 
A. The Worthington Hooker School Expansion 
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In January 2010, a new Worthington Hooker school located on 691 Whitney Avenue in 
the East Rock neighborhood was formally dedicated. The East Rock neighborhood, a 
predominantly white area, is considered one of New Haven’s wealthiest neighborhoods.115 Plans 
for the school’s expansion on that site started almost ten years prior to that, however. It was only 
after a long and winding path involving a “leaked” map from a closed meeting between school 
parents and school officials, an intense site selection period involving collaboration between city 
planners and neighborhood residents, a contentious process to approve a PDD for the chosen site, 
an abandonment of the approved PDD application in favor of a zoning ordinance and map 
amendment, and a lawsuit challenging those amendments ending in the Connecticut Supreme 
Court that the school expansion succeeded.  
In tracing the school’s land use approval process, this case study focuses on the nature 
and extent of community involvement at the various stages. The case ultimately shows a highly 
sophisticated and wealthy neighborhood using a wide range of organizing and legal tools to 
shape an ad hoc process with substantial room for community engagement that seemingly 
bordered on control at times. Thus, the process led not simply to participation, but what one 
might term highly meaningful participation. The Worthington Hooker school expansion also 
demonstrates how the City may approach community participation when the development is 
clearly city-owned and implemented.  
1. The Leaked Flyer and Site Selection Process 
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In 1998, the City of New Haven initiated an ambitious school construction program to 
renovate existing schools and build several new ones.116 By 2000, parents at the existing but old 
and “out-of-code” Worthington Hooker school (Hooker) began to pressure the Board of 
Education to consider expanding and renovating their school even though it was not scheduled 
until a later phase of the school construction project.117 As a result of this pressure, several 
parents were able to meet with representatives from Gilbane, the construction company 
managing the school construction program, city officials, and neighbors.118 However, an 
anonymous flyer was distributed in the East Rock neighborhood after these meetings, stirring 
alarm by “warning that a proposed expansion would require taking down five to seven historic 
homes” in the area.119 In response to the “hue and cry” that followed,120  the mayor expressed a 
commitment to not take any homes. A planning committee comprised of parents, neighbors,121 
and elected officials emerged to tackle the issue.122 
The planning committee proceeded to distribute a “detailed, five-page survey” to 2,000 
households registered to vote in the 9th, 10th, and 19th wards.123 Approximately five hundred 
residents responded. Among other questions, it asked residents to rank several proposed 
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locations for an expansion of the Hooker school.124 A flurry of meetings then took place 
throughout 2001. At least three subcommittee meetings were held between mid-May and early 
June, for example. Advance (and even multiple) notices for the subcommittee and community-
wide meetings during this period appeared in the New Haven Register, the City’s principal 
newspaper.125 Coverage of these meetings highlights participants’ level of engagement early on 
with questions of representation, process, and accountability. For example, some pushed back on 
the subcommittee, alleging that it had not formally notified residents about its meetings. At a 
May 2001 meeting, the president of the Ronan-Edgehill Neighborhood Association, an area 
potentially affected by proposed sites, stressed that the subcommittee had to “make sure people 
are not handpicked to favor certain points of view.”126 Additionally, he argued that the 
subcommittee in calling itself a ‘public body’ should be prepared “to follow rules of the state 
Freedom of Information Commission” and “defend” what it was doing in front of that 
commission.127And apart from the debates occurring at public meetings, residents also engaged 
in a vigorous public debate through the New Haven Register over the legitimacy of the 
subcommittee, procedures for decision-making, notice, the line between deliberation and 
consensus, and the distinction between public and private mechanisms for community 
engagement.128 
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2. City Plan Steps In   
After more than six months of deliberation at the planning subcommittee, the CPD 
stepped into the discussion with its own report. In preparation for this intervention of sorts, the 
CPD had set criteria for choosing sites, and aimed to consider practically any suggestion that fit 
within that gross criteria.129 The CPD report ultimately assessed twenty potential sites. But 
according to Karyn Gilvarg, head of the CPD, the report was admittedly not very analytic. The 
department believed it would make more sense to simply present all the relevant information to 
the neighborhood’s highly educated residents and “let them parse through it.”130 City officials 
presented the report at a Hooker School meeting on January 9, 2002. 131 Not surprisingly, the 
City’s report concluded, as the neighborhood had, that there was “no ideal spot” for the school 
expansion.132 
Following the public meeting at which the CPD presented its assessment of 
approximately twenty potential sites, a meeting at the CPC was scheduled to arrive at a final 
recommendation. Another flurry of newspaper articles and letters to the editor shows more 
debate about public participation and the decision making process. Residents discussed, for 
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instance, the nature and value of the city planners’ expertise and, again, whether there had been 
adequate notice of 2001 subcommittee meetings.133 Approximately 150 residents attended the 
February 6, 2002 CPC hearing and approximately forty signed up to speak.134 And by that point, 
opponents had hired “an attorney, traffic consultant and home appraiser.”135 On March 20, 2002, 
the CPC officially recommended building the Hooker school at 691 and 703 Whitney Avenue on 
property “owned by both the Whitney Life Church and the American Red Cross.”136 
By November 2003, more than a year after the CPC approval, the purchase of the 
Whitney Avenue Church property137 had been approved by the Citywide School Building 
Committee, the Board of Education, and the Board of Aldermen.138 The Parent Teacher 
Organization submitted more than 250 signatures in support of the purchase at the Board of 
Aldermen meeting, in addition to the more than 90 letters of support submitted by other 
interested parties.139 More than sixty parents and residents attended that final Board of Aldermen 
decision.140 Additionally, regular letters to the editor in addition to other articles submitted by 
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supporters and opponents continued to pepper the pages of the New Haven Register between the 
expansion’s approval at the CPC and Board of Aldermen.141  
3. The Abandoned Planned Development District (PDD) 
 After the Board of Aldermen approval of the Whitney site, though, another battle was yet 
to begin with the City’s PDD application for the site. PDDs, as previously mentioned, are a 
flexible zoning tool. They are used to create a “specially tailored zoning district…upon 
application by the landowner for a large parcel of land.”142 As Ravikumar Jayaraman stated in 
her study of New Haven’s PDD process, the “device  makes large-scale land uses--hospitals, 
apartment buildings, company offices, schools, a community of beach houses--possible where 
underlying zoning did not envision them.”143 In this case, the PDD application on the part of the 
City came into play because the purchased site at 691 Whitney Avenue was split-zoned. The 
eastern side of the parcel abutting Everit Street was zoned as residential single family (RS-1).144 
The western side of the parcel abutting Whitney Avenue was zoned as residential high-density 
(RH-1). 145  
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In order to approve the construction of a school on the site, the city sought to rezone the 
parcel as a PDD.146 The CPC hearing on the PDD application in October 2004 saw opponents 
and supporters of the PDD turn out in “vocal force.”147 A group of about 50 opponents had hired 
a lawyer, and they were quoted threatening legal action. 148 One stated that she did not think the 
CPC would listen to them and that she thought it “‘w[ould] all be lawyers.’”149 Another “warned 
that running fast and loose with zoning regulations could violate city law.”150 Indeed, supporters 
“shot back at opponents” for using “zoning issues as a ‘pretense’ for striking down the plan.”151 
The CPC permitted five hours of public comments pertaining to the plan at the hearing,152 but 
despite vocal opposition, the CPC approved the PDD and recommended it to the Board of 
Aldermen.153 
4. A Zoning Ordinance and Map Amendment  
 Before the Board of Aldermen could address the Whitney Avenue PDD, however, the 
state Court of Appeals invalidated the PDD tool in another lawsuit.154 The Board of Education 
rescinded its PDD application. In its place, the CPD submitted applications for a proposed 
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amendment to the zoning ordinance and map that would permit the school construction.155At the 
CPC hearing on the amendments on March 23, 2005, an attorney for the board of education 
testified, as did “approximately thirty-eight members of the community,” including a lawyer and 
expert for opponents. 156  
On April 6, 2005, the CPC approved the amendments four to zero with one member 
abstaining.157 A public hearing on the amendments at the Board of Aldermen’s Joint Committee 
on Community Development and Legislation then took place on April 11, 2005. 158 In response 
to the CPD’s recommendations after its hearing, the proposed amendments before the aldermen 
included a modification of the proposed language on parking provisions; a “savings clause 
specifying that the zoning ordinance would remain in full force and effect except as amended;  
and new language specifying when the amendment would go into effect.159 But by that point, 
opponents seem to have left the public forum and process in favor of litigation. On May 16, 
2005, the full Board voted on the amendments. Twenty-three members voted in favor, three 
abstained, and none opposed.160  
5. The Legal Fight 
Opponents filed a lawsuit challenging the Board of Aldermen’s decision on June 28, 
2005. After the CPC later approved a site plan regarding the school construction, an appeal of 
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that decision was later consolidated with the original appeal of the Board of Aldermen’s decision 
on the amendments.161 In fact, no opponents testified against the site plan approval.162 The 
Superior Court judge ruled in favor of the opponents, finding that “the amendments were not 
consistent with the city’s comprehensive plan.163 An appeal of the superior court’s decisions on 
the amendments and site plan were transferred and consolidated to the Connecticut Supreme 
Court.164 The state Supreme Court found that the trial court should not have overturned the 
CPC’s decision.165 
 Ultimately, the process that developed after the “leaked flyer” was entirely ad hoc, and 
the head of the CPD recognizes it as such.166 It allowed for approximately six months of 
deliberation amongst residents and between city officials and residents prior to any major 
decision. In what constitutes a rather stunning informal mechanism for community participation, 
residents were able to get the CPD to virtually work for them in drafting a report that assessed 
any feasible suggestions for a school site. In addition, newspaper notice, both through stand 
alone announcements and discussions in countless articles and editorials about upcoming 
meetings, went far beyond what the land use statutes previously discussed require. The case also 
shows residents going to lawyers early on in the process before any hearings on-the-record; 
coverage of the hearings shows lawyers and threats of legal action featuring prominently at those 
hearings. Throughout the entire process, residents showed a sophisticated understanding of 
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zoning law as well as relevant state law. Indeed, apart from invoking the Freedom of Information 
Act, for example, some opponents of the Whitney Avenue site even helped to successfully lobby 
for a state statute on PDDs that sets more stringent standards only for New Haven.167 
B. The Science Park Development 
Around 2007, a large scale development project began in the Science Park industrial area 
of New Haven which neighbors the Newhallville and Dixwell neighborhoods. In stark contrast to 
the East Rock neighborhood involved in the Hooker school expansion, Newhallville and Dixwell 
are characterized by high rates of poverty and a predominantly African American population.168 
The development involves the construction of a parking garage for over 1,000 cars as well as the 
conversion and renovation of an abandoned factory into a mixed used space offering office 
space, apartments, and some retail. Two developers have been involved in the current 
development: Winstanley Enterprises (Winstanley) and Forest City Enterprises (Forest City).  
These recent developments have been referred to as the Winchester or Science Park 
development. This paper will use these terms interchangeably. 
Overall, the development’s close relationship with the Science Park Development 
Corporation (SPDC), a public-private entity, renders the project relevant for understanding how 
the city may view and develop community participation processes, as well as how developers 
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and communities may shape such participation, when a public-private entity such as SPDC is 
involved. In addition, the project’s proximity to and impact on the Newhallville and Dixwell 
neighborhoods offers insight into how community participation may function in an area 
generally considered low-income and minority.169  
1. The Science Park Development Corporation and Developers 
The SPDC was founded in 1981 as a partnership between Yale University, the City of 
New Haven, and the Olin Corporation, which had operated an arms manufacturing facility in the 
80-acre industrial site known as Science Park.170 The SPDC’s goal is to redevelop the large 
industrial complex and “re-purpose the buildings and sites for new commercial and light 
industrial uses.”171 Additionally, the Science Park complex is part of a Municipal Development 
Plan172 established in 1981, a Planned Development District approved in 1983, and the 
Newhallville Renewal and Redevelopment Plan.173 The ownership structure of the various 
parcels of land in Science Park is complex: parcels are owned by Yale University, SPDC, and 
private owners. SPDC also leases much of the property to private companies like Winstanley. 
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The City’s control or direct involvement in Science Park is also difficult to pinpoint. Kelly 
Murphy, the City’s Economic Development Administrator, is a board member of the SPDC.174 
Other members include at least one neighborhood resident and a Yale representative.175 The 
recent ownership transfers of Parcel K, part of the Science Park complex, illustrates the complex 
and somewhat blurry ownership structure. Until February 2010, the City owned Parcel K. At that 
time, the City transferred its title to this parcel to SPDC which then entered into a Memorandum 
of Understanding with Winstanley to develop a day care center on the site.176  
The developments referred to in this paper as the Winchester or Science Park 
developments refer to the main developments occurring in the Science Park area between 2007 
until late 2010. More specifically, this case study  focuses on the community participation 
accompanying the following large-scale projects: 1) the building of a parking garage with retail 
at 276 Winchester Avenue by Winstanley under a long-term lease to a Winstanley affiliate by 
SPDC; 2) the rehabilitation of 344 Winchester Avenue, an old gun factory, into offices and 
parking by Winstanley under a ground lease to a Winstanley affiliate by SPDC; and 3) the 
rehabilitation of 275 Winchester Avenue, old factory buildings to be converted into a mix of 
retail and offices, through a partnership between Winstanley and Forest City under a long-term 
lease for the site issued by SPDC.177 The development of the site at 275 Winchester had 
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originally been awarded to Forest City around February 2008,178 but the two developers 
partnered to rehabilitate that site in early 2010.179 
2. Developers Enter the Newhallville and Dixwell Neighobrhoods. 
In May 2008, Winstanley appeared before the CPC to address an application for a Site 
Plan Review, a minor modification to the PDD General Conditions, and a Special Permit, all of 
which concerned the parking garage planned for 276 Winchester Avenue. The property “is 
owned by two SPDC affiliates and is ground leased to a Winstanley affiliate.”180 Approximately 
30 individuals attended the meeting (apart from city staff and commissioners), and the CPC 
approved all three applications. More importantly for this paper’s analysis, the minutes of the 
mandatory CPC hearing associated with the Special Permit reveal details regarding the 
developer’s outreach to the community prior to the CPC hearing.  
Both Winstanley and residents present at the CPC meeting repeatedly addressed the issue 
of community engagement. Notably, Carter Winstanley’s introduction summarized his eleven 
years of involvement in New Haven and stated that he had met with “the tenants, management 
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teams and the alderpersons from the neighborhood.”181 He also almost immediately mentioned 
that his team had reduced the number of parking spaces in the original 1500 space garage to 
1186 in response to neighborhood concerns, although it is certainly possible that 1500 spaces had 
been a soft number for Winstanley from the beginning. The project, he stated, would involve no 
public financing and would be fully taxable. Before opening up the discussion to public 
comments, Mr. Winstanley stressed that he had been in contact with local unions about 
construction jobs and was committed to achieving the city’s hiring goals of 25% minority, 6.9% 
women and 20% local residents for the project. However, he had not committed to this in any 
written or contract form at this point.182  
The record of the May 2008 CPC hearing also shows that the developer had been in 
contact via mail with Alfreda Edwards, an alderwoman representing the neighborhood most 
directly affected by the garage development. But despite the documented outreach to the 
neighborhood, various residents and Alderwoman Edwards voiced opposition to the project as 
well as the kind of input (or lack thereof) that the community had been able to provide. 
Alderwoman Edwards testified that she had had two meetings with the developer to discuss the 
plan, but she believed that garage was too large and ultimately refused to support it. The majority 
of other individuals testifying voiced concerns about the environmental impact of the 
construction as well as traffic. Additionally, Alderwoman Edwards and at least two other 
neighbors called for additional conversations with the developer and/or concern about the “tone 
of the conversations with the developer.” Nonetheless, the developer and his attorney 
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emphasized that the project met the necessary legal standards, and the CPC voted unanimously 
to adopt the Special Permit.  
Winstanley continued to meet with residents after the site-plan approval to update them 
on the environmental clean-up of the property.183 In seeking approval from the city’s EDC for 
plans associated with the separate 344 Winchester Avenue project in February 2009, Winstanley 
mentioned that his team had removed a fence on the property after residents voiced that they 
were “uncomfortable with the wrought iron, ‘gated’ feel of Science Park.”184 Moreover, 
Winstanley’s formal application to the EDC stated that Winstanley’s team had “spoken with the 
Dixwell and Newhallville Management Teams, aldermanic representatives and members of the 
community about the progress of the garage project and…plans for 344 Winchester Avenue.”185 
The EDC approved Winstanley’s plans.186 
While Winstanley met with neighborhood management teams, unions, and alderpeople in 
early 2008, Forest City initiated its own contact with the neighborhoods surrounding its 275 
Winchester Avenue development. A newspaper article announcing Forest City as the preferred 
developer quotes the head of SPDC stating that the company would meet with neighborhood 
groups to “get input on the project,” and subsequent newspaper articles covered the developers 
meetings with both the Newhallville and Dixwell Management Teams. The meetings that 
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followed in February 2008 show about 15 people present at the first Dixwell meeting and about 
40 present at the second Newhallville meeting.  
While the Dixwell meeting appears to have met with little opposition from the 
neighborhood, the Newhallville meeting saw more suspicion and opposition. Neighbors were 
mainly concerned with “[d]ensity and increased traffic…as they would bring both congestion 
and air pollution to an area where asthma rates are already high.”187 At least one resident 
complained that residents “never seem to see [their] input in the final product.”188 Alderwoman 
Edwards suggested that “community members get together on their own” to discuss their 
reactions to the project and follow up with developers in June. Notably, the newspaper article on 
the first Dixwell meeting mentioned the date for the second Newhallville meeting. Whether this 
notice contributed to the marked increase in attendance at the second meeting is unclear, but it 
may have played a role. It appears that no additional meetings took place between residents and 
Forest City until October 2008, however. At that meeting, it appears that Forest City mainly 
updated community members regarding its plans.189  
The City through the EDA also made efforts to engage the community directly on the 
Science Park developments. EDA hosted a meeting with Newhallville and Dixwell residents in 
September 2008, for example. Management team members, an alderwoman representing the 
area, and residents expressed a desire to “be taken seriously” and participate in planning “from 
the beginning.”190 Christine Bonanno, an EDA staffer leading the meeting, responded that “the 
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purpose of the meeting was to get city officials to directly engage with residents.” She elaborated 
that it is “about building relationships and having an open dialogue…[and] about 
transparency.”191  In addition to attempting increased dialogue with residents, at least one city 
staffer generally attends the neighborhood management team meetings.192 According to Tony 
Bialecki, the EDA’s Deputy Director, the EDA has focused in recent years on ensuring that 
members of its staff serve as liaisons to different neighborhoods.193 Nevertheless, the 
effectiveness of this goal is disputed by other community groups and individuals who do not 
believe City Hall gives residents sufficient notice of projects or allows for meaningful 
involvement in the planning process.194  
In 2008 and 2009, the Economic Development Commission (EDC) also independently 
discussed ways to become more involved with communities affected by developments that fall 
under its purview. The EDC, composed of fifteen members195 appointed by the mayor and 
including one elected member of the Board of Aldermen, must approve changes to municipal 
development plans (MDPs) like the 1981 MDP including the Science Park area.196 In June 2008, 
for example, the Commission seriously discussed how to avoid operating like a “rubber 
stamp.”197 Commissioners suggested appointing a “commission liaison to the public for each 
project,” in addition to possibly “asking the Mayor’s Office to carbon-copy a point person on all 
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e-mails related to a given project” and “shifting the standard operating procedure of the 
commission to promote more in-depth study by the body.”198 Additionally, the commission 
asked the EDD about the status of its website and even wondered whether social media like 
Facebook could increase the commission’s visibility and the community’s ability to engage with 
it.199  
3. Modification of the Planned Development District (PDD) 
It was not until Winstanley and Forest City partnered to develop the old factory at 344 
Winchester Avenue and submitted an application for a zoning map and text amendment to 
amend the PDD applicable to the site that a new round of opposition emerged. The zoning map 
and text amendments sought to add a parcel (what basically corresponds to 275 Winchester 
Avenue or Parcel L) to the existing PDD.200 The SPDC and developers submitted the joint 
application on June 29, 2010 to the Board of Aldermen and Town Clerk. It was then made 
available to the public at both the CPD and EDD on July 8.201 The application would require 
approval by the CPC, the Legislation Committee of the Board of Aldermen, and the full Board of 
Aldermen before final passage. It would also require approval by the EDC and the New Haven 
Redevelopment Authority to ensure conformity to the applicable municipal development and 
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redevelopment plans. Subsequently, the project would require a detailed Site Plan approval at 
CPC.202  
At least as of May 2010, staff at the EDD had been communicating with developers to 
develop a timeline for the PDD modification application and approval process. As part of that 
process, the developers met with the Newhallville and Dixwell Management Teams as well as 
three aldermen representing those neighborhoods. EDD staff was in communication with the 
developers at least one month before meeting with the Management Teams to assist with 
scheduling and preparation of materials.203 Indeed, email communications between city staff and 
the developers show the city following up with developers to inquire about the outcome of the 
neighborhood meetings with special attention paid to attendance.204 
But despite the city’s and developers’ efforts to communicate with residents and 
community leaders, the CPC hearing on the PDD modification proved highly contentious. 
Prominent community leaders, including a state representative, “decried a lack of community 
input” in the development process.205 They called for the process to “slow down” in order to 
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better evaluate the plans, which several people claimed they had not seen.206 In response to 
complaints about access to the plans, Ed Mattison, the head of the CPD, stated that the plans had 
been made available for public viewing in the department’s offices in City Hall.207 Opponents 
also “raised concerns about traffic, tax abatement, and local hiring.”208  
Against a backdrop of opposition throughout the “tense three-hour meeting,” 
commissioners nevertheless voted unanimously to recommend approval of the application, 
arguing that “their role as a recommending body is limited to zoning matters only.”209 In 
addition, the Chair of the commission stated that “neighbors need[ed] to take some 
responsibility” for the lack of communication. He added that “[n]eighbors need to make clear 
and reasonable requests.”210 Moreover, in response to a commissioner’s request for clarification 
on the possibility of a community benefits agreement, the head of the CPD responded that “[a] 
community benefits agreement usually was generated when City land was being transferred (in 
this case Science Park owned the land) or when there were city funds involved.” 211 It is notable 
that such a characterization of community based agreements runs counter to the common 
definition of such agreements as those entered into between communities and developers.   
Even with the CPD’s approval, however, the PDD modification application appears to 
have set off intense negotiations and discussions among city staff, aldermen, and developers that 
ultimately led to a quick diffusion of the hostility, concrete gains by the community, and ultimate 
                                                          
206 Id.   
 
207 Id.   
 
208 Id.  
 
209 Id.  
 
210 Id.  
 





approval by the Board of Aldermen. The EDD, for example, sent a chronology of community 
outreach efforts to the head of the Legislation Committee of the Board of Aldermen prior to its 
hearing on the matter in response to the committee’s request for such information.212 Notably, 
the chronology of events included a letter from the developer’s attorney to Kelly Murphy, the 
Economic Development Administrator, indicating that it would voluntarily aim to achieve the 
City’s goals for City construction projects relating to the hiring of residents, minorities, women, 
and small and minority businesses.213 Prior to the CPC hearing, the developer had not committed 
to this in writing.214 In addition, although unreported, at least one alderperson believes that a 
crucial meeting took place between the developers, aldermen, and city staff after the contentious 
CPC meeting to iron out the developers’ commitment to jobs and secure neighborhood approval 
before the Board of Aldermen hearings.215 Moreover, in the week after the CPC hearing, 
Winstanley also had “several meetings with community groups and conducted tours of the 
Winchester site.”216 
In contrast to the CPC hearing, the Board of Aldermen Legislation Committee meeting 
was described as a “four-hour public hearing of mostly favorable remarks.”217 The committee 
voted unanimously to approve the PDD modification, although it withheld “favorable” 
recommendation. This allowed the aldermen to propose the modification for final approval while 
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also adding reservations, although not in the form of conditions, “about traffic, local job hiring, 
and the level of input from the immediate neighborhood.”218One of the committee members 
described the strategy as one that “gives [them] time to tweak [the recommendation], to have 
meetings, [and] to get things on paper.”219 The full Board of Aldermen approved the PDD 
modification a few weeks later.220 
Overall, the relationship between developers and the community appears to have been 
mostly one where management teams received information and updates about the project, 
although there is some evidence of responsiveness in terms of the substance of the developments 
(i.e. the taking down of the fence by Winstanley; the reduction in parking spaces; and a letter to 
the EDA stating a commitment (albeit not enforceable in any way) to following the City’s hiring 
goals for construction developed out of neighborhood conversations). In terms of neighborhood 
expertise throughout the approval process for both the Winstanley and Forest City developments, 
lawyers appear to have been absent, and at least the chair of the Newhallville Management Team 
at the time, Roxanne Condon, acknowledges limited expertise in land use. She had not heard 
about CBAs, for example, and admits that her community may have been able to bargain more 
effectively with developers had they had a more sophisticated understanding of the process.221 
She had mainly conceived of the relationship between residents and developers as one of 
information-sharing and was generally satisfied with the one or two meetings that took place 
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between neighbors and developers each year from the time Winstanley and Forest entered the 
area to the final approval of the PDD modification.222  
Aldermen appear to have been regularly involved in the development process and 
neighborhood discussions as evidenced by their participation in the CPC hearings, presence at 
management team meetings, and an interview with Roxanne Condon, the Newhallville 
management team chair.223 It is important to note, nevertheless, that a number of other aldermen, 
community organizers, and community organizations interviewed generally agree that one 
cannot rely on aldermen to actively engage with their constituents or serve as a main conduit for 
citizen engagement in the land use process.224  
Finally, the PDD modification process undoubtedly proved the peak organizing and 
leverage point for the community surrounding the Winchester development. While vocal 
opposition at the CPC failed to stop the proceedings, the fact that the PDD modification proposal 
still had to pass the Legislation Committee and full Board of Aldermen appears to have slowed 
the process down enough for opposition to use the threat of its resistance as real leverage in 
negotiating a concrete commitment on jobs from the developers. Notably, the PDD approval 
standards are also broad enough that they allow an infusion of political and non-technical 
concerns into the final decision.225 Thus, the case highlights the potential of the PDD process to 
galvanize opposition, slow down the approval process, and increase community leverage in 
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negotiation, all factors which arguably promote or facilitate meaningful participation in 
development decisions. 
C. The Yale School of Management (SOM) Expansion 
In September 2007, Yale University announced that it had chosen a design firm and site for 
its construction of a new SOM.226 It sought to build a new structure on a site occupied by two 
historic buildings in the East Rock area. The site is bordered on the east by homes on Lincoln 
Street and to the north by the driveway to the New Haven Lawn Club, a private New Haven club 
chartered in 1891.227 The proposed structure would occupy approximately 237,000 square feet of 
building space and accommodate up to 600 students.228 Yale had started to meet with residents 
since March 2006 about the development.229  And within weeks of the September 2007 
announcement of the selection of a design firm and site, preservationists responded and planned 
to mobilize neighborhood groups and organizations.230 The entire site was owned by Yale 
University.231  
On October 13, 2009, Yale University submitted an application to create a new PDD for the 
site in order to consolidate the two zones splitting the site: an RM-2 (High Middle Density) and 
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RO (Residential-Office) zone.232 Because university uses are allowed “as of right” in the two 
zones, Yale’s PDD application did not propose a less-restrictive use on either zone, and it did not 
seek expansion of any pre-existing nonconforming uses.233 By the time the first CPC hearing on 
the PDD application came about in November 2009, at least the Lawn Club and the New Haven 
Urban Design League had retained lawyers to represent them throughout the formal process.234 
At the meeting, close to ten individuals spoke in favor or in opposition to the project. Those in 
favor largely praised the advantages a state of the art school would bring to New Haven. Those 
opposing the project cited a threat to home values, interference with light and traffic, the historic 
status of the pre-existing buildings, and the adequacy of the PDD application. Commissioners 
unanimously voted to leave the record open for additional written submissions prior to the next 
monthly meeting in December at which it would formally vote on whether to recommend the 
project to the Board of Aldermen. One of the commissioners emphasized that the Board of 
Aldermen hearings would provide “the opportunity for the public to engage…in a less restrictive 
manner.”235 
The CPC approved the PDD application in December 2009,236 and Yale continued to meet 
with neighbors and the Lincoln-Bradley Association, a group of homeowners in the adjacent area 
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in anticipation of the Legislation Committee hearing.237 Prior to the Legislation Committee 
meeting on January 28, 2010, Yale had modified its plans to give “residential neighbors more 
side yard breathing room.”238Nevertheless, the Legislation Committee saw strong debate on the 
issue. Yale, for example, submitted more than 200 signatures in support of the project from 
architects, construction workers, neighbors, and businesses.239 Public testimonty comprised 
thirty seven pages, including testimony by Joseph Tagliarini, an abutting owner, who “prepared 
boards containing drawings showing the effect on his property of the proposed structure.”240 In 
response, the committee extended the public hearing to the next meeting on February 11, 2010.  
Approximately 150 people attended the second hearing representing both sides of the issue. 
Yale emphasized that it had done extensive outreach over four years, holding eight neighborhood 
meetings, more than a dozen meetings with individual property owners, numerous e-mail, 
telephone, and informal communications with interested individuals, and making the plans 
available for public view for 120 days.241 After four hours of deliberation, the committee 
                                                                                                                                                                             
supplemented sub nom. Tagliarini v. New Haven BOA, CPC, CV106010699S, 2011 WL 1366639 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
Mar. 14, 2011). 
 
237 Melinda Tuhus, East Rocker Query: Why the Teardowns?, NEW HAVEN INDEPENDENT (Dec. 22, 2009), 
http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/east_rocker_query_why_the_teardowns/; Allan 
Appel, SOM Plan Revised, NEW HAVEN INDEPENDENT (Jan. 22, 2010), 
http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/som_revised1/.   
 
238 Allan Appel, SOM Plan Sparks Fiery City Hall Hearing, NEW HAVEN INDEPENDENT (Jan. 29, 2010), 
http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/som_do_som_dont/.   
 
239 Id.  
 
240 Tagliarini v. New Haven Bd. of Aldermen, CV106010699S, 2011 WL 1288638, at *9 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 11, 
2011). 
 
241 Allan Appel, Committee Oks New SOM Home, NEW HAVEN INDEPENDENT (Feb. 12, 2010), 
http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/yale_school_of_management_design_advances/; 




approved the proposed PDD for full Board of Aldermen consideration.242 By the end, the 
committee had held approximately ten hours of public hearing on the issue.243  
Ultimately, at the March 1, 2010 full Board of Aldermen hearing, ninety six percent of the 
Board of Aldermen approved the proposed PDD.244 However, Joseph Tagliarini filed an appeal 
in Superior Court of the Board of Aldermen’s decision.245 He alleged that the PDD approval 
process was ‘“arbitrary and illegal substantively’ and ‘fatally flawed procedurally.’”246 On 
March 11, 2011, the Court dismissed the appeal, holding that it could not find that the Board of 
Aldermen “acted outside the bounds of its permitted legislative discretion in approving the 
PDD.”247 
Generally, the community participation that occurred throughout the planning and approval 
of the SOM building was organized and entirely led by Yale. While the CPD may have 
encouraged the university as it encourages most, if not all, private developers to meet with the 
neighborhood prior to submitting a formal application, the university clearly took the lead in 
doing so.248 Notably, hearings on the SOM PDD plan were extended at both the CPC and 
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Legislation Committee levels. Lawyers for opponents and the developer were also present in 
discussions as early as the first CPC hearing, adding substantially to the level of expertise at 
those hearings and shaping the nature of the arguments in opposition to the project. And, as both 
the Worthington Hooker and Winchester case studies demonstrate, the issue of community 
participation was front and center at many of the hearings. Indeed, the first slide of Yale’s 
presentation at the Board of Aldermen hearing in this case consisted of a summary of the 
university’s engagement with neighbors on the project.249 Additionally, the judicial decision 
affirming the PDD’s approval emphasized the importance of comments made by residents 
throughout the formal hearings. The decision stated that courts should utilize comments made by 
residents about the proposed plan in evaluating whether the proposal abides by one of the PDD 
requirements that the plan must, in part, “complement the design and values of the surrounding 
neighborhood.”250 
D. The East Shore Power Plant Expansion  
In August 2010, the Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSEG), the City of New 
Haven, and community groups signed a CBA concerning PSEG’s expansion of its power plant in 
the East Shore neighborhood. East Shore is a largely white, suburban-like neighborhood.251 The 
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CBA in this case was the first CBA in New Haven that included community groups as 
signatories.252 The company sought a state permit to operate three new “peaker” generators “to 
be used when the regional electrical grid needs extra power.”253 The path to this CBA presents 
an especially relevant case study for the assessment of community participation in New Haven in 
that it was subject to a unique and robust set of formal mechanisms for community engagement 
that only apply to companies seeking to establish or expand facilities in environmental justice 
communities under Connecticut’s new 2009 environmental justice law.254  
 In accordance with the environmental justice law, any company seeking a permit from 
the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) or the Connecticut Siting 
Council (Siting Coucil) for a “facility that is defined as an affecting facility and is proposed to be 
located or expanded in an environmental justice community” must comply with the following 
process requirements: 1) file a meaningful public participation plan and receive approval for 
such plan prior to filing an application with either DEP or the Siting Council; 2) “consult with 
the chief elected official or officials of the town or towns in which the affecting facility is 
proposed…to evaluate the need for a community environmental benefit agreement; and 3) notify, 
in writing, local residents and environmental groups potentially affected by the facility activities 
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and operations;” and 4) submit a final report to DEP through its Environmental Justice Program 
which documents the implementation of the Plan.255  
The DEP Public Participation Plan forms and guidelines have attempted to give meaning 
to the statute’s requirements. For example, in requiring applicants to identify a time and place for 
an informal public meeting, the form explains that the applicant “must take into consideration 
convenience for the residents of the affected environmental justice community.”256 DEP goes so 
far as to suggest announcements in multiple languages when appropriate, use of church bulletins, 
and radio broadcasts.257 Newspaper notice “must be a minimum one-quarter page advertisement” 
and the basic form requires an applicant to consider additional notice mechanisms and 
specifically indicate which ones will be utilized.258 No such printed guidelines or forms are 
utilized by the City in arranging community participation in the types of public, public/private, or 
private developments previously described. 
1. The Beginning 
In this case, City staff began discussions with the company well in advance of any 
community involvement. The City assumed a hard stance from the beginning, making it clear to 
PSEG that it would oppose any expansion that would lead to a net increase in emissions. Only 
upon agreement on the no increase in net emissions would the city begin to consider including 
jobs or tax issues into negotiations. After some reluctance on PSEG’s part to negotiate seriously, 
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the company came back to the City with increased seriousness approximately one month before 
the first public hearing in August 2009.259 PSEG convened this first public hearing, and the City 
did not formally assist the company in reaching out to neighborhood groups in anticipation of 
this meeting because the City saw such outreach as part of PSEG’s responsibility.260 However, 
various community groups learned that the City was talking with PSEG through informal 
channels.261  
Dozens attended the first public meeting, including state and local representatives, 
presenting significant opposition to PSEG’s expansion which was grounded in environmental 
and health concerns. 262 A variety of coalitions, neighborhood groups, and community 
representatives subsequently joined forces. They included the New Haven Environmental Justice 
Network (NHEJN), which formed in response to this particular project, the Connecticut 
Coalition for Environmental Justice (CCEJ), the Connecticut Fund for the Environment (CFE), 
the East Shore Management Team, the Forest Avenue Business Association, State 
Representative Bob Magna, and the aldermen representing the East Shore area.263 
2. Negotiating with Community Representatives 
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After the initial public meeting, negotiations began between city, PSEG, and community 
groups. Initially, community representatives met primarily with Robert Smuts, the City’s Chief 
Administrative Officer; a community organizer characterizes the meetings as meetings as mainly 
information-sharing ones.264 However, the meetings eventually transitioned into negotiations 
with city staff, neighborhood groups, and PSEG officials in the same room. These meetings were 
not public meetings on the record,265 and they remained relatively small with approximately ten 
core representatives.266   
Alegre believes that the shift to meetings where community members could negotiate directly 
with PSEG resulted from two conscious community strategies for increasing leverage. First, 
community groups gathered approximately two hundred signatures opposing any net increases in 
pollution from the expansion, an action which may have effectively shown their commitment to 
the issue. Second, Roger Reynolds, a senior attorney for the Connecticut Fund for the 
Environment who worked closely with the various coalitions and community groups, submitted a 
request to DEP for a public information session to be conducted by PSEG pursuant to §§ 22a-
174-2a and 22a-174-33.267 Such a public information session would require a substantial amount 
of investment in time and money from PSEG, and it was clear to organizers that PSEG would 
want to avoid this if possible. Additionally, Alegre believes that the Connecticut Coalition for 
Environmental Justice’s successful opposition of a permit to operate New Haven’s English 
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Station Power Plant in 2001 may have contributed to the community’s leverage in this case.268In 
a sense, various groups had become repeat players with a reputation for effectiveness. 
3. The CBA 
While the City continued to be committed to no increase in net emissions throughout the 
process, community groups pushed for operational changes that would require the plan to 
implement new, pollution-reducing technology prior to expanding. Eventually, PSEG, the City, 
and community members reached a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that later formed the 
basis of the CBA. Chief Administrator for the City, Robert Smuts, stated in an interview that the 
City deferred largely to the advice of CFE’s lawyer in negotiating specific terms.269 The MOU, 
in part, guaranteed that PSEG would offset emissions of nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxides, and 
particulate matter. The company agreed to submit an annual report to the City documenting the 
total generation of such gases and particulate matter. In addition, PSEG promised to contribute 
$500,000 for funding projects “that will have the maximum benefit for the air quality in the 
neighborhoods surrounding the Facility.”270 The MOU specified that the City “shall make all 
efforts to reach consensus with NHEJN, CCEJ, CFE and the relevant community with respect to 
the exact projects for which the [funds would be] utilized.”271 Alegre believes that groups 
retained significant control over the specific plans for the funds with the City contributing to the 
thinking and final approval.  
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In return for PSEG’s commitments, the City and community groups agreed to not oppose 
the permit. The City promised to publicly state its support “in state or local regulatory 
proceedings concerning the Project upon reasonable requests of PSEG.”272The NHEJN and 
CCEJ agreed to withdraw their request that PSEG hold a public information session under the 
state statutes mentioned above.273 The final signatories to the January 2010 CBA included the 
co-chairs of the NHEJN, the president of the CCEJ, the executive director of CFE, New Haven’s 
mayor, and president of PSEG Power Connecticut LLC.274 The Board of Aldermen ultimately 
approved receipt of funds into a separate account from which only the City could withdraw 
funds. 275  
Overall, the case offers insight into how formal mechanisms outside of the usual (and 
arguably minimal) federal, state, and city mechanisms like the 2009 Environmental Justice law 
can alter dynamics between the city, developers, and residents by creating additional leverage for 
community groups. The fact that the process led to the first CBA with community groups as 
signatories generally reflects well on the potential of those formal mechanisms if one seeks more 
meaningful community participation in land use decisions. Nevertheless, other factors may have 
played an important, if not more crucial role, in arriving at such a CBA. As previously 
mentioned, the City in this case was committed to no increase in net emissions from the start and 
open to community participation.276 Community groups and neighbors concerned with 
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environmental issues had organized successful opposition to a power company around 2001. 
Additionally, an active statewide coalition was in place, evidenced by the successful lobbying for 
the 2009 Environmental Justice law. The various community groups that emerged were led by 
paid organizers, such as Nathalie Alegre, and experts in environmental law, such as Roger 
Reynolds, the lawyer with CFE. 
 In addition, the East Shore neighborhood affected, while generally middle class and perhaps 
not as sophisticated as the East Rock neighborhood involved in the Hooker school case, may 
have gained useful organizing experience throughout a heated battle over a PDD designation 
which ended at the state Supreme Court in 2007.277 When asked whether the 2009 law played a 
crucial role in the process, Smuts explained that the City would have likely gotten involved and 
intervened in the process regardless.278 In his view, the main benefit derived from the law was 
the significant advance notice.279 He believes the City would have faced a tougher challenge 
organizing and “getting geared for a fight” without it.280 
VI. MAKING SENSE OF NEW HAVEN’S APPROACH TO COMMUNITY 
PARTICIPATION AS ILLUSTRATED IN THE FOUR CASE STUDIES 
                                                          
277See Ravikumar Jayaraman, supra note 9; Campion v. Bd. of Aldermen of City of New Haven, 272 Conn. 920 
(2005). Additional research and interviews would be necessary to establish this link. The PSEG power plant is 







278 Interview with Robert Smuts, supra note 259. 
 
279 Id.  
 




The following section aims to more fully distill from the previous sections just how 
community participation functions in New Haven. It will first focus on how the formal and 
informal mechanisms at play in the case studies come together, emphasizing the unique 
importance of class and the PDD process in achieving meaningful participation. It will then 
briefly go back to the question of whether changes in takings law may also influence city 
planners’ approach to community participation. The section will also point to several normative 
questions and concerns that could help both planners, communities, organizers, and public 
interest lawyers assess their roles in New Haven’s current and future development.  
A. Formal and Informal Mechanisms for Community Participation at Play in New Haven 
 Despite New Haven’s outward commitment to community participation in principle, the 
City operates under a very limited formal process for community participation. The formal 
mechanisms at play rarely go beyond simply informing residents at some point or another of 
development plans in their neighborhood through newspaper, and in some cases, individual 
notice. However, the land use approval process, as a whole, offers substantial leeway for 
communities to informally shape the process according to popular demand in order to increase 
their influence. The four case studies probed in this essay demonstrate just how communities can 
and do shape the community participation process by both demanding ad hoc, project-specific 
mechanisms for participation and deriving as much use as possible from formal ones. However, 
even though communities can not only participate but actually shape a participation process, it is 
clear that sophistication and class (and arguably race insofar as it often correlates with class) 
affect just how successful a community is in doing so. Finally, the case studies generally point to 
the unique role of the flexible PDD process in ensuring meaningful community participation in 




generalizations from four cases studies may not lead to the most accurate or definitive 
conclusions.  
1. Condensing the Formal Mechanisms  
As Section IV above discusses, federal laws, which don’t always play a role in local land 
development, may require “meaningful participation.” However, such “meaningful participation” 
has not been formally defined and generally lacks any real teeth. At the state level, the ordinary 
land use laws do not offer much to ensure “meaningful participation.” They usually provide only 
a week or two weeks of advance notice and access to applications or materials submitted by 
developers. A few local ordinances add to the state laws, especially when it comes to 
personalized notice. But few city ordinances add much in terms of advance notice beyond the 
usual one or two weeks or access to zoning applications by residents. Arguably, the most robust 
provisions for advance notice of hearings and advance access to materials (at least in comparison 
to the state laws) can be found in the process for changing the text of the zoning ordinances or 
maps, which also applies to approving a PDD or PDU, a process not unique to New Haven. 
Indeed, and perhaps understandably so, the head of the CPD prefers to steer clear of formal 
mechanisms for participation because of the potential liability they create.281 
2. Distilling the Informal Mechanisms 
With regards to informal mechanisms for participation, the case studies make clear that 
public outreach on the part of developers is a common concern and topic of conversation 
regardless of whether the development is public, public-private, or private. The CPC, EDA, 
EDC, and Board of Aldermen all affirmatively participate in and perpetuate a narrative that 
                                                          





considers some form of community participation in land use decision-making essential to the 
decisions’ legitimacy. In terms of informal mechanisms utilized by City staff, the CPD and EDA 
are both committed to promoting some type of community participation. As the case studies 
demonstrate and interviews confirm, at the CPD, developers are always encouraged to meet with 
residents in the areas their development will affect in order to obtain support and generally 
respond to concerns. At the EDA, staff also encourages developers to meet with residents, and 
individual staff members act as informal liaisons to the various neighborhoods. As previously 
mentioned, in both departments, the more “public” the project, the more involved city staff will 
be in actually organizing meetings with neighbors and encouraging developers involved to 
engage the community.282 The sliding scale of city involvement in designing the community 
participation process depending on how public the project is, however, does beg for increased 
scrutiny on the City’s use of public-private vehicles like the SPDC for development considering 
the ease with the various public and private actors involved appear to transfer and lease 
properties.  
In addition, the case studies highlight both the CPD’s and EDA’s openness to designing 
informal mechanisms on a project-by-project basis and in accordance with resident demands. In 
the Hooker school case, residents pushed the city to support its subcommittee to choose a school 
site not only by allowing it to operate for six months before jumping in, but by actually funding 
thousands of surveys mailed out to registered voters in the area. Moreover, the CPD’s analysis of 
the approximately twenty potential sites for the school expansion essentially shows residents 
putting CPD staff to work on research they desired. In the Winchester case, vocal opposition to 
the Winchester’s PDD modification application led to intense behind-the-scenes negotiations 
                                                          





amongst aldermen, residents, city staff, and the developers which ultimately elevated the 
community’s role from mainly passive information-receivers to true participants and 
stakeholders in the development negotiations (although the developer’s commitment to jobs was 
not secured in enforceable contract form ultimately). And in the East Shore PSEG expansion 
case, community groups succeeded in using a statutory mechanism available to them for 
participation to develop an even more robust informal process than what the already uniquely 
robust statute envisioned.  
3. The Role of Class 
Nevertheless, the case studies presented indicate that sophistication and class matters in all of 
this. More specifically, the class and education of a neighborhood seems to lead to 1) more 
intensive community involvement in discussions with City and/or developers earlier in the 
process; 2) greater deference at the CPC and Board in the form of extensions for public hearing 
or comment; and 3) better use of formal mechanisms for participation as well as legal challenges 
to land use decisions on the part of residents.   
First, as previously noted, the Hooker school case shows a highly sophisticated neighborhood 
taking control of the land use decision-making process early on. Notably, residents continually 
pushed the subcommittee and City to consider what constitutes appropriate notice to neighbors, 
challenged the definition of “public,” and ensured that the skirmishes fought through letters to 
the editor of the New Haven Registere provided continued updates to the neighborhood on the 
process as well as notice of upcoming meetings and opportunities for involvement. In the East 
Shore case, an established community of sophisticated environmental advocates worked closely 
with the neighborhood to secure an active place in negotiations with the City and power 




relationship where the community only received information from the power company about its 
plans to a more substantive kind of involvement.  
Second, it is notable that the CPC and Board of Aldermen extended the process repeatedly 
and considerably when neighbors in the SOM case complained of insufficient input and 
generally voiced opposition to the project. The first public hearing at the CPC occurred in 
November 2009 and did not reach a full vote by the Board of Aldermen until March 2010. In 
contrast, despite vocal opposition at the CPC hearing on the Winchester proposed PDD 
modifications and multiple complaints that neighbors had not felt included in the process or had 
access to the CPC application, the Board unanimously decided to move the decision forward. 
Perhaps commissioners in the SOM case saw more legitimate arguments where residents focused 
on traditional land use issues like traffic, light, and home values, as opposed to the Winchester 
case where residents mainly asked the developer to create jobs. However, one then has to ask to 
what extent the CPC may be swayed by opposition that simply happens to find more 
sophisticated outlets or framing strategies for disguising simple NIMBYism. Indeed, in 
analyzing CPC minutes from 2007-2010, it is notable that the one other instance where the CPC 
extended the hearing to give the developer additional time to meet with the community and 
negotiate occurred when Albertus Magnus College sought to expand a parking lot in the East 
Rock neighborhood (the same neighborhood involved in the Hooker school case).  
Yet, the idea that traditional property-related arguments like those invoking light or 
traffic constitute  more legitimate objections to a development than non-property concerns like 
job creation points back to the equity or empowerment theories for community participation 
outlined in Section III.  In essence, should wealthier residents have more power to shape their 




traditional zoning and planning arguments to oppose a development in favor of what is arguably 
an already pleasant or comfortable status quo enabled by existing zoning codes? And conversely, 
should struggling communities like Newhallville and Dixwell who want and need development 
not have any say in how that development should improve, at least to the extent feasible, the 
status quo of their neighborhood through things like job creation?   
Third, as previously discussed, the East Shore case shows how a community’s access to 
legal expertise can significantly affect the kind of participation process that develops. Lawyers in 
that case used the threat of using state public hearing statutes to gain leverage while also shaping 
the substance of the CBA. The Hooker and SOM cases show lawyers actively participating in the 
CPC and Board public hearings. They posed a threat of litigation, presumably creating some 
leverage for their clients, while ensuring that the public record reflected their clients’ concerns 
adequately in case of an appeal.  Notably, another school expansion in the Hill neighborhood, 
one of the City’s poorest, did not have lawyers intervene until public hearings had concluded.283 
Residents filed a lawsuit challenging the decision on equal protection grounds, among other 
claims. They argued, for instance, that “when the [City] defendants engaged in the Prince-Welch 
school construction project, the defendants intentionally excluded them from participating in the 
site selection process, and that the defendants intentionally excluded them on the basis of 
race.”284 In rejecting all of plaintiffs’ claims in the case, the court at one point faulted the 
plaintiffs for not having initiated their lawsuit sooner under the doctrine of laches. It found that 
“because the plaintiffs ha[d] not offered a reason why they waited approximately two years 
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before filing suit and because the defendants ha[d] demonstrated significant prejudice,” the 
defense of laches barred one of plaintiffs’ claims.285 The court did not consider whether the 
plaintiffs’ educational levels or lack of sophistication could have contributed to their delayed 
legal action. Ultimately, and in perhaps the most extreme example of how a community’s access 
to expertise can affect the decision-making process, at least some resident activists in the Hooker 
case were involved in successfully lobbying for statutory reform at the state level that would 
alter New Haven’s PDD process in their favor. 
4. The PDD Process as Useful Tool for Communities Seeking More Meaningful 
Participation 
 Finally, the Hooker school, Winchester, and SOM developments all highlight how the 
PDD process, which is also the process for amending the text of zoning ordinances or map, 
(hereinafter “PDD process”) repeatedly acts as a useful entry point and vehicle for meaningful 
community participation. In the Winchester case, in particular, the PDD fight marked a peak 
point for community participation and arguably formed a crucial leverage point for negotiations 
between community and developers. In the SOM case, the CPC first extended the hearing for 
additional written submissions so that it took at least two months to pass. Evidence indicates that 
Yale may have responded to the pressure first created at the CPC hearing when it agreed to 
provide neighbors more side yard “breathing room.”286 The Legislation Committee at the Board 
of Aldermen then extended its own hearing. Yale ultimately submitted at least 200 signatures in 
support over 30 written letters at the final hearing, and over 150 people attended. These facts 
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could demonstrate that the extension allowed for additional and potentially valuable developer 
community outreach and negotiations.   
Indeed, Ravikumar Jayaraman’s previous study of New Haven’s PDD process highlights 
how the PDD incorporates neighborhood interests to achieve a “process [that] enables applicants 
to bargain with neighbors, city planners, and local government to find deals where everyone can 
benefit.”287 This paper generally agrees with Ravikumar Jayaraman’s observation that the PDD 
process presents a valuable tool for community input in zoning decisions. However, it adds a few 
caveats.  
Ravikumar Jayaraman’s article particularly highlights how the PDD process facilitates 
representation of community interests by imposing few standards for review, allowing the CPC 
and Board of Aldermen to consider wide ranging issues and concerns. Indeed, while the CPC is 
still generally limited to considering the “quality of the proposal,” the Board of Aldermen 
hearing is seen as even more open to discussion of any “issues…constituents deem relevant.”288 
Additionally, the author sees the involvement of aldermen as a means of ensuring that 
community interests are represented in how other aldermen generally defer to a ward’s vote 
when the PDD only affects that particular ward.289 Ravikumar Jayaraman also stresses that 
aldermen ensure that unreasonable neighbors are not given undue power.290  
In terms of caveats and additional observations, I note that Ravikumar Jayaraman’s 
account may overstate the importance of aldermen in making the PDD process a tool for 
substantial community input. Organizers, aldermen, and city staff repeatedly challenged the 
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representativeness of aldermen in that their involvement is often arbitrary and are oftentimes 
elected by only a few hundred people in their ward.291 Second, I caution that a community’s 
class and education may affect the extent to which the PDD serves as a useful tool for 
community participation. The process is only useful for communities wishing to oppose PDDs or 
other zoning amendments subject to the same path for approval to the extent that they understand 
the process and possess some organizing skills. Third, I posit that the time delay built into the 
PDD process via the three separate hearings required presents a valuable organizing tool in and 
of itself.  
Ultimately, in practice, the PDD process appears to promote external organizing and 
more democratic decision-making in land use by offering communities, and not just aldermen, a 
real entry point into substantive negotiations with City staff and/or developers prior to the final 
Board of Aldermen decision. This quality, in turn, may require additional thinking about how 
changes to the PDD’s standards could alter the leverage communities currently derive from the 
process. It is possible that limiting the CPC’s and Board of Aldermen’s  PDD discretion could 
reduce the potential influence of opposition to a project and leave communities not otherwise 
equipped to design (or demand) a meaningful process for participation with even less influence.  
B. The Impact of Takings Law on New Haven’s Approach to Community Participation 
In attempting to understand how takings law may influence the City’s approach to 
community participation, one could arguably look to case studies over time. However, interviews 
with the City’s chief planner and Deputy Director of Economic Development indicate that such 
analysis is not necessary in this case. When explicitly asked if the City has considered takings 
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law in its approach to community participation, Gilvarg answered definitively that the City is 
more concerned with developers leaving the city than with potential takings problems. In other 
words, she is more concerned with ensuring that community groups do not impose unreasonable 
demands on developers because they might simply choose not to invest in the City than with 
designing a process that avoids coercion. Bialecki, on the other hand, appeared to leave the legal 
considerations to Gilvarg’s department and did not indicate that he or others in the EDA have 
considered takings law in their community participation approach.292 Additionally, a desire to 
avoid creating liability through formal processes also appears to influence City Plan more than 
consideration of the potential indirect implications of Nollan and Dolan.293 Thus, the tension 
between the trend for increased community participation and takings law changes, which initially 
prompted this paper’s investigation of community participation in New Haven, does not appear 
to represent a real tension for New Haven planners. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In sum, this is only a limited look at how one City thinks about and carries out 
mechanisms for community participation. It appears that New Haven’s planners, zoning officials, 
residents, and neighborhood representatives, for the most part, have internalized the trend 
towards increasing meaningful community participation in land use decision making. New 
Haven operates under a very limited formal process for community participation despite its 
outward commitment to such participation in principle. Nonetheless, the land use approval 
process offers substantial room for communities to shape the process according to popular and 
organized demands, especially the more “public” the project at play. Moreover, New Haven’s 
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planners and economic development officials have not changed or otherwise shaped community 
participation processes with recent takings decisions in mind. Other potential implications of 
community participation, such as competitive federalism, factor much more prominently in their 
strategy.  
However, the equity implications of how class may determine just how successful 
communities will be in shaping ad hoc community participation processes in New Haven merit a 
reevaluation of the City’s current approach to such participation. On equity grounds, it seems 
that planners could, and perhaps should, think about how to better empower less sophisticated 
communities to derive the kind of leverage and bargaining that wealthier, more educated 
communities like East Rock are already achieving. Indeed, even if one doubts the value of or 
need for more meaningful participation, the impact of class on how communities engage with 
land use suggests that the same equity concerns would remain (if they will not actually be 
exacerbated), if one were to simply revert to the minimum participation requirements embodied 
in notice and hearing laws. For example, with only a two week notice of a zoning hearing, a 
sophisticated resident with some knowledge of zoning will be much more likely to attend, seek 
legal counsel, and shape the official record in his favor than a resident with less education. The 
less sophisticated resident is more likely to remain in the dark and forego any involvement in 
decisions that will shape his or her neighborhood.  
On the other hand, public interest lawyers and community activists may want to think 
about new ways to take advantage of the City’s current openness to ad hoc participation 
procedures. They may also want to consider how to better utilize the PDD process’ flexibility 
and perhaps even resist changes to the current PDD standard that would reduce that flexibility. 




New Haven planners’ proven openness to ad hoc community participation processes. Finally, 
this paper suggests that additional research on the how communities participate  in land use 
decision making in other cities could help establish, among other things, 1) whether low-income, 
minority communities have benefited from ad hoc participation procedures elsewhere; 2) how 
formal mechanisms for achieving more meaningful community participation than what is 
normally required in notice and hearing laws may function in other cities; and 3) perhaps even 
whether we should reevaluate due process requirements in land use decision making given the 
disparities in how wealthy, predominantly white communities interact with land use versus low-
income, predominantly minority communities. 
 
 










